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PRIVATE RISK ALLOCATIONS UNDER CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION
The costs of liability under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act' (CERCLA) are a sig-
nificant concern to buyers and sellers of real estate.2 Allocation of
this potential liability is an important part of many commercial
property transactions.3 These allocations alter the risk of liability
associated with purchasing real property.4
CERCLA liability risks are frequently distributed among buy-
ers and sellers through contract agreements negotiated as part of
the purchase and sale.' The agreements may take the form of an
1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) (CERCLA or Superfund), imposes joint and several strict
liability on past and present owners of property contaminated with hazardous substances.
CERCLA provides a cause of action for the government and private persons to recover
costs incurred in cleaning up contaminated property. CERCLA § 107. Due to the high
costs of CERCLA cleanups, buyers and sellers of real estate face an incentive to mini-
mize their risk of liability under the statute.
2. Recent estimates indicate that it will cost $752 billion over the next 30 years to
clean up known CERCLA sites. See Marianne Lavelle, Superfund Studies Begin to Fill
Hole in Data-Dry Field, NAT'L. L.J., Jan. 20, 1992, at 19 (reporting results of study by
the Waste Management Research and Education Institute at the University of Tennessee).
The magnitude of this expense has a significant impact on business decisions, par-
ticularly with respect to commercial real estate. See generally J. GORDON ARBUCKLE, Er.
AL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 96 (10th ed. 1989) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW HANDBOOK] ("The fact that CERCLA liability can be so all-encompassing and per-
vasive - coupled with the fact that CERCLA cleanups are becoming incredibly expensive
- is dramatically affecting the manner in which companies engage in business and real
estate transactions.").
3. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 96-97 ("Companies . . .
devote a good deal of effort negotiating over contract terms respecting how any CERCLA
liabilities might be allocated."); Mary K. Ryan, The Superfund Dilemma: Can You Ever
Contract Your Liability Away?, 75 MASS. L. REV. 131, 131 (1990) (-The parties to com-
mercial real estate and corporate transactions in the post-Superfund era have tried to ad-
dress concerns about hazardous waste liability through a variety of contractual devices.");
George Pilko, Negotiating a Fair Division of Environmental Costs, MERGERS & ACQUISI-
TIONS, Mar.-Apr., 1990, at 58, 59 ("[M]any organizations are learning to effectively incor-
porate specialized expertise in environmental risks into their negotiating processes.").
4. For purposes of this note, "risk" refers to the likelihood that a party will incur
CERCLA response costs. See discussion infra part IV.A (discussing the characteristics of
private risk allocation). This narrow use of the term differs from the definition of risk in
other environmental contexts. Compare Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals
and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208-14 (1978) (defining environmental risk by
nine characteristics impairing ability to predict actual likelihood of potential adverse out-
comes) with Alvin L. Am, Managing Environmental Risks, ENVTL F., May 1985, at 12,
12 (defining risk as the potential toxicity of a substance combined with the potential for
human exposure). Other business risks associated with the decision to purchase real estate
are not considered.
5. See Kathryn E.B. Robb, Environmental Risks: Paying for Someone Else's Mistakes,
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indemnity, 6 a hold harmless clause,7 or a boilerplate "as is" provi-
sion contained in the purchase agreement.8 Alternatively, parties
FIN. EXECUTIVE, Mar. 1991, at 28 ("[A] purchasing company must be able to identify the
risks that real estate acquisitions present, and the firm must exercise business judgment in
deciding whether those risks are worth taking and whether a deal can be structured to
allocate the risks in a manner acceptable to both buyer and seller.").
6. An indemnity is a contractual assumption of another party's risk for anticipated
liability. Penny L. Parker & John Slavich, Contractual Efforts to Allocate the Risk of
Environmental Liability: Is There A Way To Make Indemnities Worth More Than The
Paper They Are Written On?, 44 S.W. L.J. 1349, 1349 n.1 (1991). In an indemnity, one
party agrees to pay future costs accruing to the other party. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 769 (6th ed. 1990) (defining indemnity as "Reimbursement . . . . A contractual
or equitable right under which the entire loss is shifted" and indemnify as "[Ti secure
against loss or damage; to give security for the reimbursement of a person in case of an
anticipated loss falling upon him. . . . [To make good; to -compensate; to make reim-
bursement to one of a loss already incurred by him."); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1147 (1971) (defining indemnify as "to exempt from incurred penal-
ties or liabilities . . . to make compensation to for incurred hurt or loss or damage").
In a typical transaction, buyer might agree to indemnify seller for environmental
response costs in exchange for a reduced purchase price. Alternatively, seller might in-
denify buyer against liability arising from existing contamination at the time of the
transfer. See Gail V. Karlsson, The Impact of Environmental Liabilities on Real Estate
Contract Negotiations, 8 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 37, 59 (1990). Since the indemnitor ac-
tively assumes a burden which would otherwise remain with her adversary, indemnification
agreements impose an affirmative shifting of responsibility between the two parties. See
infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text (distinguishing between risk shifting and risk
shielding).
7. In a hold harmless agreement, one party agrees "to hold the other without respon-
sibility for . . . liability arising out of the transaction involved." BLACK'S LAW DICTIo-
NARY 731 (6th ed. 1990). In other words, one party agrees that it will not sue the other
for claims associated with the property. Many agreements incorporate both indemnification
and hold harmless language, requiring one party "to indemnify and hold harmless" the
other party for liability arising out of the transaction. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v.
Ashland Oil, 696 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.N.J. 1988) (contract term providing that "[s]eller
shall protect, defend . . . indemnify and save and hold harmless [b]uyer"); see also CPC
Int'l v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1282 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (identifying a
contract releasing landowners from liability caused by former owners); American Nat'l
Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg., No. 89-C-0168, 1990 WL 125368 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22,
1990) (indemnification and hold harmless clause contained in agreement); Rodenbeck v.
Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1451 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (a third party agreed
to "hold harmless and indemnify"). While indemnification represents an active shifting of
risk between the parties, a hold harmless agreement merely shields the benefitted party
from the risk of suit brought by the other party. In other words, one party agrees to
refrain from imposing liability on the other, rather than affirmatively assuming the other's
liability. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
8. An "as is" agreement requires the purchaser to take the property in the same form
as offered by the seller, implying that the buyer takes the risk of any defects not revealed
by its own inspection. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (6th ed. 1990). Evoking the com-
mon law doctrine of caveat emptor, the inclusion of an "as is" clause is commonplace in
many purchase and sell agreements. See Wiegmann & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus., 735
F. Supp. 957, 961 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (distinguishing an "as is" clause from a release, the
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may negotiate a release agreement as part of the sale or as part of
an independent settlement.9 Whether these or other legal terms are
used, t" the intent of the agreements is to distribute liability risks
between the contracting parties through private negotiations."
These agreements are referred to throughout this note as "private
risk allocations."
To a great extent, environmental policy induces private risk
allocation. t2 Due to high cleanup costs, buyers and sellers want to
court stated, "the 'as is' clause in this case, was standard, boiler-plate language routinely
included in every contract and deed for the transfer of property owned by [seller]-).
While the clause may be effective as a waiver of common law warranties attaching to the
property, most courts have found an "as is" provision by itself insufficient to protect
against the risk of claims for CERCLA liability. See id. ("as is" clause protected seller
from claims for breach of warranties, but was ineffective to protect seller from CERCLA
liability claim); see also cases cited infra note 239.
9. A release is the relinquishment of a claim or right to the party against whom the
claim might have been asserted. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1289 (6th ed. 1990) (citations
omitted) (defining release as "The relinquishment, concession, or giving up of a right,
claim, or privilege, by the person in whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the person
against whom it might have been demanded or enforced. Abandonment of claim to party
against whom it exists, and is a surrender of a cause of action and may be gratuitous or
for consideration. Giving up or abandoning of claim or right to person against whom
claim exists or against whom right is to be exercised."); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY 1917 (1971) (defining release: as verb, "to give up (a claim, title,
right) in favor of another," as noun, "an act or instrument by which a legal right is dis-
charged"); Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1454 (N.D. Ind.
1990) (citation omitted) ("A release is a surrender of a claimant's right to prosecute a
cause of action."). This term encompasses the same "shielding" concept as hold harmless
provisions because one party is protected against the risk of suit brought by the other
party. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text (distinguishing between risk shifting
and risk shielding). However, since releases are more commonly negotiated as a separate
term standing alone, see Parker & Slavich, supra note 6, at 1349-50 n.1 (releases defined
to mean "general releases of claims and liabilities contemplated by settlement agree-
ments"), rather than as a coordinate term standing in conjunction with an indemnification
agreement, see supra notes 6-7, release agreements may be accorded greater weight than
hold harmless agreements. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp.
1285, 1292 (D. Minn. 1987) (holding that a general release "from all claims, demands
and causes of action" is sufficient to release a party from CERCLA liability), appeal
dismissed, 871 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1988).
10. Another form of private risk allocation would be the negotiation of. warranty terms
in the purchase agreement. See Karlsson, supra note 6, at 44-47 (providing often request-
ed examples of warranties and representations concerning environmental conditions). While
warranties have a similar intent and effect to the terms defined, they are not discussed for
purposes of this note.
11. See discussion infra part IV.A.1.
12. The application of risk management practices to the negotiation of real estate trans-
actions is consistent with emerging trends in environmental policy generally. See Page,
supra note 4, at 242 (recommending proactive anticipation of risks .rather than passive
reaction to risks in response to crisis); Am, supra note 4, at 12 ("Risk assessment has
become the new buzzword in the environmental control field.-). Faced with high compli-
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minimize their exposure to potential CERCLA liability.13 Liability
may be imposed by both parties to the transaction or by outside
third parties;14 therefore, buyers and sellers face a two-fold risk of
liability. First, each party has an incentive to guard against claims
brought by the other party to the transaction. Second, both parties
want to avoid liability imposed by outside third parties, such as the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state governments,
or private individuals. I"
It is not clear, however, whether this attempt to minimize the
risk of liability is permitted under CERCLA.' 6 The statute itself
provides contradictory guidance, 7 and the obscure legislative lan-
guage has led to a split in judicial decisions.' 8 The situation is
ance costs and dwindling resources available to address environmental problems,
policymakers increasingly weigh acceptable risks against the costs of remedial action. See
Stephen D. Ramsey, At the Top of the Questions - Risk, ENvTL. F., Feb. 1986, at 24,
25 ("[IThe costs of achieving no-risk levels are ultimately limited by the availability of
resources to address them."). A related weighing of costs and benefits also occurs in
allocating the risks of environmental liability; however, in this context, the definition of
risk is fundamentally different. See supra note 4.
13. See Mark P. Fitzsimmons & Jeffery K. Sherwood, The Real Estate Lawyer's Prim-
er (and More) to Superfund: The Environmental Hazards of Real Estate Transactions, 22
REAL PROP. PROB. & "7M. J. 765, 782 (1987) ("If, after the necessary analysis of the
property is undertaken, the purchase is still attractive and financially sound, the buyer's
counsel should still minimize potential environmental liabilities through certain basic
protections in the purchase agreement.").
14. See infra notes 39-44, 46-48 and accompanying text (explaining CERCLA's liability
provisions). For a concise overview of CERCLA and related case law, see generally Kyle
E. MeSlarrow et al., A Decade of Superfund Litigation: CERCLA Case Law from 1981-
1991, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367 (July 1991).
15. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing sources of risk).
16. See Fitzsimmons & Sherwood, supra note 13, at 790 ("The risks associated with
such transactions can never be entirely avoided. Only advice on ways to minimize those
risks can be offered.").
17. See CERCLA § 107(e)(1) (1988); see infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text
(discussing the conflict within the statute).
18. Compare Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir.
1986) (release agreements do not affect CERCLA's enforcement goals and are enforceable)
with AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 529-30 (N.D. Ohio
1990) (release agreements are contrary to CERCLA policy and are unenforceable between
responsible parties). See also Danella Southwest, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 775
F. Supp. 1227, 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (describing § 107(e)(1) as "obscure"). For further
discussion of relevant judicial decisions, see infra part III.
Recent commentary mirrors this conflict in the courts. Compare Lynn E. Richter,
Note, AM International v. International Forging Equipment: Does CERCLA Allow Private
Parties to Contractually Allocate Liability for Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites?, 22 U.
TOL. L. REV. 1065, 1087 (1991) (abrogation of contractual agreements allocating
CERCLA liability is only justified if contracts are considered as an equitable factor in
apportioning liability costs) with Joseph A. Sevack, Note, Passing the Big Bucks: Con-
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disturbing because the settled expectations of buyers and sellers of
real estate may no longer be upheld. As a result, buyers and sellers
face uncertainty in negotiating future private risk allocations.
The controversy surrounding private risk allocations demon-
strates a tension between two competing policies: the efficiencies
of free market negotiations versus CERCLA's policy of placing
cleanup costs on those responsible for pollution. On one hand,
private risk distribution is more efficient than mandatory allocation
of risk through legislative fiat. 9 Through free market negotiations,
parties can take into account their respective expertise and financial
positions, the intended and past uses of the property, the extent of
contamination, the likelihood of future sales to third parties, and
the effect of these considerations on price.20 The negotiation of
private risk allocations enhances the ability of parties to anticipate
their exposure to CERCLA liability, lending predictability and
stability to real estate markets. In an era of declining real estate
markets,2' and of slow progress in the CERCLA program,
22
tractual Transfers of Liability Between Potentially Responsible Parties Under CERCLA, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1571, 1587-89 (1991) (§ 107(e)(1) prohibits contractual transfers of liabil-
ity between parties already liable under CERCLA but permits such transfers to persons
not otherwise liable under the statute) and Larry M. Sargent, Case Comment, AM Interna-
tiona4 Inc. v. International Forging Equipment: Release Agreements Between Private Par-
ties Under CERCLA, 21 MPM. ST. U. L. REv. 423, 429 (1991) (enforcement of indemnity
clauses would create harsh results in cases involving unsophisticated litigants and would
contradict CERCLA policy to promote prompt voluntary cleanups).
19. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS O LAW § 1.2, at 13 (3d ed.
1986) ("Where resources are shifted pursuant to a voluntary transaction, we can be rea-
sonably sure that the shift involves an increase in efficiency.-); see also Daniel A. Farber,
Contract Law and Modem Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 303, 310 (1983) (cita-
tion omitted) ('Assuming that trades between parties are both voluntary and are made
with full knowledge, every trade logically must be to the benefit of both parties.-);
Charles L Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE LJ. 1261, 1265 n.18 (1980) ("The assumption that enforcement of
bargains promotes allocative efficiency is widespread.-).
20. See Karlsson, supra note 6, at 54 ("[N]egotiations concerning the allocation of
environmental responsibilities will be conditioned on the relative needs and strengths of
the parties, the degree of contamination, and the desirability of the property if uncontami-
nated."). Information regarding the extent of contamination and past use of the property is
provided by the widespread use of environmental audits. See Ryan, supra note 3, at 132
("[Ain entire industry has developed to provide site investigation and cleanup services.");
Linda J. Collins, Environmental Risk Advisers in Hot Demand, Bus. INS., Oct. 8, 1990, at
3 (reporting 40 percent annual growth in demand for environmental consultants since 1985
and stating that the largest growth has been in area of environmental audits); Susan Q.
Stranahan, Environmental Audits Becoming Part of More Commercial Transactions, CHI.
TRIB., July 14, 1991, at 2H (noting that audits are increasingly required to obtain financ-
ing).
21. See infra note 144 and accompanying text (dealing with the decline in real estate
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freedom of contract may be increasingly important to ensure proper
market functioning.
On the other hand, CERCLA imposes strict liability on current
and former owners of contaminated property.23 By establishing a
strict liability standard, Congress intended to place cleanup costs on
those parties responsible for creating environmental pollution.24 Of
the various justifications for strict liability, 25 Congress particularly
stressed a retributive rationale for CERCLA's liability provisions,
transactions due to CERCLA); Richter, supra note 18, at 1083 (citation omitted) ("Real
estate practitioners agree that federal hazardous waste legislation, particularly CERCLA and
the broad liability imposed by the courts, has had a chilling effect on the purchase, sale,
and financing of real estate.").
22. See William N. Hedeman, et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspec-
tive on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envil. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413, 10,415
n.13 (July 1991) (collecting government reports criticizing various aspects of CERCLA's
functioning); Coalition Plans to Lobby Congress to Seek Fundamental Changes to
CERCLA, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2301 (Jan. 31, 1992) (reporting that cleanups have been
completed at only 65 of the 1245 CERCLA sites identified).
23. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text (citing statutes and cases which im-
posed strict liability).
24. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 998 (D.NJ.
1988) (citation omitted) (noting that CERCLA liability provisions "reflect a Congressional
intent to allocate the financial burden of cleaning up hazardous waste sites between those
parties responsible for causing the contamination"); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co.,
668 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Minn. 1987) ("'Congress intended that those responsible for
problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for
remedying the harmful conditions they created.'") (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)), appeal dismissed, 871 F.2d
1091 (8th Cir. 1991).
25. The legislative history, detailed infra at part II, indicates congressional recognition
of strict liability as a legitimate means to distribute societal costs through traditional mar-
ket mechanisms:
Strict liability . . . assures that those who benefit financially from a commercial
activity internalize the health and environmental costs of that activity into the
costs of doing business. Strict liability is an important instrument in allocating
the risks imposed upon society by the manufacture, transport, use, and disposal
of inherently hazardous substances.
S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980), reprinted in I SENATE COMM. ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980
(SUPERFUND) PUBLIC LAW 96-510, at 320 (1988) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The
report also noted the chemical industry's ability to "pass on" CERCLA fees through the
market. Id. at 21-22. Congress also recognized that strict liability serves a deterrent func-
tion. See id.- at 14 ("An important aspect of strict liability is that it would create a com-
pelling incentive for those in control of hazardous substances to prevent releases and thus
protect the public from harm."); see infra notes 176-80, 230-32 and accompanying text
(arguing that allocation of costs through strict liability is a legitimate policy choice by
Congress).
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emphasizing that costs would fall on the parties to blame for creat-
ing pollution problems.26 Unfortunately, the "polluters pay" ratio-
nale is not always justified because strict liability imposes costs on
"innocent" purchasers and other owners irrespective of who is in
fact responsible.27
This note explains why buyers and sellers of real estate should
be permitted to allocate CERCLA liability risk through private
agreements. Part II of this note provides an overview of CERCLA
and reviews its legislative history, concluding that the statute pro-
vides unsatisfactory guidance regarding private risk allocations. Part
III reviews the split in judicial authority and examines the tension
between the free market and retributive rationales for and against
private risk allocations. Part IV proposes an analysis of private risk
allocations which defines these agreements and describes how they
function. Additionally, part IV sets out a clear judicial framework
through which courts can determine the enforceability of private
risk allocations in a given case. Based on principles derived from
the proposed analytical framework, the note concludes that private
risk allocations serve the beneficial function of spreading CERCLA
costs without diluting CERCLA liability.
I. LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF PRIVATE RISK ALLOCATION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) was hastily enacted during the closing
days of the 96th Congress.28 The bill established a $1.6 billion
26. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing the congressional intent to
make responsible parties bear the cleanup costs).
27. See infra notes 45, 56 and accompanying text (landowners often held liable regard-
less of participation).
28. The legislative history of CERCLA provides an interesting lesson in legislative
process. See generally 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at v (outlining the history
of CERCLA and the difficulty of enacting the legislation in the closing days of the 96th
Congress); 36 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 573, 584 (Congressional Quarterly,
Inc. 1980) [hereinafter CQ ALMANAC 1980] (noting that "something-no matter how
flawed-was better than nothing"); Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfind") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1982) (discussing the rush to enact CERCLA during the final
days of the 96th Congress); Public Lands, Toxic Chemicals Dominate 96th Congress, 2d
Session, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,231, 10,232 (1980) (discussing the faults of
CERCLA due to its hasty enactment).
President Carter originally proposed Superfund legislation in 1979. In September
1980, after extensive committee hearings in both chambers, the House adopted two sepa-
rate measures providing a total of $1.95 billion for Superfund, $350 million more than
the President had requested. In the Senate, meanwhile, a more ambitious $4.1 billion
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trust fund,29 now known as the Superfund,3° to pay for cleanup
costs at the nation's most serious hazardous waste sites.3' After
several years of investigating toxic waste scandals,32 such as the
Love Canal disaster in Niagara Falls, New York,33 Congress de-
measure was approved by the Environment and Public Works Committee but appeared
doomed when Congress recessed for the November elections. "Prior to the election, envi-
ronmentalists had threatened to hold out for more concessions . . . . That kind of talk
ended Nov. 4." CQ ALMANAC 1980, supra, at 573, 592 (also noting jurisdictional conflict
between senate committees). Ronald Reagan's landslide election victory brought Republican
control of the Senate and a new conservative mandate. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
25, at vii ("[S]ubsequent events during the lame-duck session were colored by the fact
that the Republicans would become the majority party in the Senate in 1981."). This
prospect provided renewed stimulus for congressional leaders to seek prompt action on
Superfund legislation. CQ ALMANAC 1980, supra, at 584, 592. The previous legislative ef-
forts by various committees were redrafted to produce the final $1.6 billion bill during
private meetings between Senate leaders. Id. at 592. After final Senate approval, this
revised version was presented to the House in an unusual "take-it-or-leave-it" floor proce-
dure on December 3, 1980, two days before Congress was scheduled to adjourn. Id. at
593. The Senate version of the bill was grudgingly approved by the House without
amendment in a close vote of 274-94, 28 votes more than necessary to pass the bill
under suspension of the rules. Id. at 584. Under the circumstances, it was not necessary
to convene a conference committee between the House and the Senate. Id. at 593.
29. Title II of CERCLA was separately entitled the Hazardous Substance Response
Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 201, 94 Stat. 2767, 2796, reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 32. Section 221 of this Act established the Haz-
ardous Substance Response Trust Fund. 94 Stat. at 2801 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 9507
(West 1989)), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 37.
30. Section 517 of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1772 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9507
(1988)), created the Hazardous Substance Superfund. Section 517(e)(2) provides that the
Superfund shall be treated as the continuation of the original Hazardous Substance Re-
sponse Trust Fund. SARA § 517(e)(2).
31. There are currently over 1,200 sites on the EPA's National Priorities List.
CERCLA § 105(8) required the President to develop "criteria for determining priorities
among releases or threatened releases throughout the United States for the purposes of
taking remedial action." 94 Stat. at 2779 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1988)), re-
printed in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 15. The National Priorities List was
developed pursuant to this authority and contains a list of sites deemed eligible for r~me-
dial action. See 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. B (1991).
32. Congress held over 50 hearings throughout the 95th and 96th Congress. These are
usefully summarized in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, app. IV at 355-71 (bib-
liography of congressional documents).
33. Throughout the 1940's, the Hooker Chemical Company legally buried hundreds of
55 gallon drums containing toxic wastes in a gully on its property. In 1958, the gully
was filled in and sold (for $1) to the City of Niagara Falls for a school and playground.
Modest homes were also built and the community became known as Love Canal. In
1978, it was discovered that wastes were percolating from the canal into the basements of
many homes and that disease rates were alarmingly high. The area was eventually evacu-
ated. See 126 CONG. REC. 30,937-39 (1980) (statement of Sen. Moynihan providing de-
tailed chronology of Love Canal events), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
25, at 700-04. For additional information on the Love Canal disaster and recent resurrec-
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dared a need "for appropriate environmental response action to
protect public health and the environment" from the dangers of
hazardous substances.' Due to political necessities, 5 however,
the final legislation was produced in private "closed-door" negotia-
tions between Senate leaders.36 In the context of this process, the
final statute was marred with numerous technical flaws and incon-
sistencies,37 including the provision dealing with private risk allo-
cations.
38
A. Overview of CERCLA Liability
CERCLA' imposes far-reaching liability on current and past
owners of contaminated property. Section 107(a) establishes four
categories of covered persons, commonly referred to as potentially
responsible parties (PRPs). 39  PRPs include present owners and
tion, see generally Richard Roth, Long-Buried Poisons Ooze Out of the Ground, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 1978, at A2; Lindsey Gruson, Home to Some is Still Love Canal to Oth-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at BI.
34. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119 and 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 48.
35. See supra note 28 (discussing the political urgency of CERCLA's enactment).
36. A letter from Senators Stafford and Randolph to House leaders pleaded for House
approval without amendment, illustrating the context of Senate negotiations:
That the bill passed at all is a minor wonder. Only the frailest, moment-to-
moment coalition enabled it to be brought to the Senate floor and considered.
Indeed, within a matter of hours that fragile coalition began to disinte-
grate .... We say this not in a spirit of ultimatum, but with the hope that
you and your Members will appreciate the difficult situation here in the Senate.
Letter from Sen. Robert T. Stafford & Sen. Jennings Randolph to Rep. James J. Florio
(Dec. 2, 1980), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 774; see also
Public Lands, Toxic Chemicals Dominate 96th Congress, supra note 28, at 10232 (noting
that "'post-election realities' [required] quick and tough judgments by both sides as to
what the political winds would bear."); CQ ALMANAC 1980, supra note 28, at 592 (dis-
cussing closed-door drafting sessions of final bill).
37. Several Members of the House criticized the Senate bill as containing numerous
technical flaws. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 31,969, 31,970 (1980) (statement of Rep.
Broyhill expressing distaste for "ridiculous" legislative practice of enacting bill containing
"hundreds of errors"), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 785, 787-
88; Grad, supra note 28, at 34 ("Opponents of the bill stressed that it contained many
substantive defects. ... Many supporters of the bill conceded that it was seriously
flawed, but asserted that it was the best that could be gotten.-).
38. CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(I) (1988); see discussion infra part II.B
(discussing the conflicting language in CERCLA § 107(e)(1) regarding private risk allo-
cation).
39. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The relevant language of the sec-
tion states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
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operators," owners and operators "at the time of disposal,"4 ar-
rangers42 and transporters.4 3 The statute imposes strict liability
which is also joint, several, and retroactive.' Moreover, non-pos-
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were dis-
posed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal
or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by
any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or oper-
ated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected
by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian Tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan ....
Id.
40. Id. § 107(a)(1).
41. Id. § 107(a)(2).
42. Id. § 107(a)(3) (imposing liability on any person "who by contract, agreement or
otherwise arranged for disposal," treatment, or transport of hazardous substances). Persons
covered under § 107(a)(3) are commonly referred to as "generators;" however, the term
"arrangers" more adequately reflects the scope of liability imposed by the statutory lan-
guage. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir.
1989) (manufacturers of pesticide may be held liabile under § 107(a)(3) based on contrac-
tual relationship with formulator who disposed of hazardous substances); United States v.
Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151, 157 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (sellers of scrap metal may be held liable
under § 107(a)(3) for waste created by buyer in the latter's manufacturing process).
43. Id. § 107(a)(4) (covering "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected
by such person").
44. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(holding that based upon federal common law CERCLA imposes joint, several and strict
liability when liability is indivisible); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174
(4th Cir. 1988) (holding that CERCLA liability is retroactive); United States v. Moltolo,
695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988) (CERCLA liability retroactive); see aLso ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 95 (containing additional case law). Congress expressed
its approval of such judicial action in report language accompanying the 1986 amendment
to CERCLA. See H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt . 1, at 74 (1985) ("The
Committee fully subscribes to the reasoning of the court in the seminal case of United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation . . . allowing for joint and several liability in appropri-
ate CERCLA cases."), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856. See generally ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 76 ("CERCLA's scope is far broader than
any of the other federal environmental statutes.").
Congress deleted language from the original bill which expressly stated that liability
was to be joint, several and strict. See, e.g., S. 1480, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(a) (1979)
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sessory land ownership is sufficient to create liability in the event
of a release of hazardous substances.45
Liability can be imposed by both public and private CERCLA
claimants.46 Most commonly, the government brings an action to
recover its expenditures from the Superfund.47 However, private
individuals can also file claims against other PRIs. 4 Thus,
(containing language imposing "joint, several, and strict liability" as originally introduced),
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 155, 169. The floor debate at the
time of final passage indicates that Congress still intended to impose a strict liability stan-
dard. However, the explicit language was omitted to avoid confusion, deferring instead to
§ 311 of the Clean Water Act and evolving common law. See 126 CONG. REc. 31,964,
31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
25, at 776, 778; 126 CONG. REC. 30,930, 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph),
reprinted in 1 LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 681, 686.
45. See, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 176 (landlord held liable for contamination caused
by tenant in possession).
46. See CERCLA § 101(5), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(5) (1988) (defining CERCLA "claimant"
as "any person who presents a claim for compensation under this chapter"); Niecko v.
Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 988 n.8 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ("In most cases, the
United States government, operating through the Environmental Protection Agency, will be
enforcing [CERCLA]. However, the Act also provides for recovery, under certain condi-
tions, by private parties."), aft'd, No. 91-2039, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20496 (6th Cir.
Sept. 1, 1992).
47. Niecko, 769 F. Supp. at 988 n.8. Besides seeking cost recovery, the government
may enforce CERCLA by commencing litigation or issuing an administrative order to
compel abatement. See CERCLA § 106(a), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a), (c) (1988) (abate-
ment actions). In addition, EPA often seeks voluntary cleanups, usually in exchange for a
release from liability, by negotiating "private party settlements." See 42 U.S.C. § 9622
(1988) (providing authority for settlement negotiations). See generally ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 97-114 (explaining substantial controversy surrounding
EPA settlement policies); Superfund Implementation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Superfund and Environmental Oversight of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 105-17 (1987) (statement of James W. Moorman, Esq.,
criticizing EPA settlement process). It is important to distinguish such administrative set-
tlements from the agreements between private parties (private risk allocations) which are
the subject of this note. As discussed infra at note 52, private risk allocations are never
binding against the government.
48. Private parties may bring an action for cost recovery under CERCLA §
107(a)(4)(B) or an action for contribution under SARA § 113(0(1). Though similar, the
two theories are distinct. See McSlarrow et al., supra note 14, at 10,401 ("Contribution
claims presuppose an initial assessment of liability for a third party's response costs,
whereas response costs may be sought by one PRP from another PRP without constituting
a suit for contribution, if they were incurred independently by that PRP.-). The express
right to contribution in § 113(0 was provided by Congress in the 1986 amendments to
CERCLA, after courts had upheld private rights of action for cost recovery under §
107(a). Jane E. Lein & Kevin M. Ward, Private Party Response Cost Recovery Under
CERCLA, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,322, 10,331 (June 1991) (discussing ele-
ments of actions for cost recovery); see Steven B. Russo, Note, Contribution Under
CERCLA: Judicial Treatment After SARA, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 267, 274-75 (1989)
(discussing contribution).
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CERCLA creates a risk of liability which includes claims brought
by the government as well as claims brought by private individu-
als.4
9
The congressional intent behind CERCLA's liability structure
was to ensure that persons responsible for hazardous substances
bear the costs of responding to the resulting pollution.5" Congress
was determined to protect taxpayers from absorbing response costs
through the Superfund when a solvent PRP was available to
pay.5 t In consistently holding private risk allocations ineffective
49. See discussion infra part V.A.1 (discussing sources of risk resulting from potential
CERCLA claims brought by private individuals and by the government).
50. The legislative history contains numerous appeals to this justification. In summa-
rizing the bill's basic elements, the first goal listed by the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee was "assuring that those responsible for any damage, environmental
harm, or injury from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions." S. REP. No. 848,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at
305, 320; see also 126 CONG. REC. 30,930, 30,932 (1980) (similar statement by Sen.
Randolph), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 681, 685. The com-
mittee report continued:
The goal of assuring that those who caused chemical harm bear the costs of
that harm is addressed in the reported legislation by the imposition of liabili-
ty . . . . To establish provisions of liability any less than strict, joint, and
several liability would be to condone a system in which innocent victims bear
the actual burden of releases, while those who conduct commerce in hazardous
substances which cause such damage benefit with relative impunity.
S. REP. No. 848, at 19, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 305,
320. The theme is continued throughout House and Senate floor debate of the various
Superfund measures. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 26,351 (1980) (statement of Rep. Volkmer
rejecting chemical industry's claims that society benefits from chemical products and thus
should bear cleanup costs), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 265.
51. The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee discussed the issue with
respect to sources of revenue for the Superfund:
A fund based only on appropriations would not be in the public interest.
Taxpayers too often are asked to remedy problems they do not help create.
Relying on general revenue to clean up past industrial mistakes could be inter-
preted by some as a public policy precedent, implying that the longer it takes
for problems to appear, the less responsible those who cause the problem are
for the solution.
Further, a fund derived exclusively from appropriations would subsidize
generators and users of hazardous substances who, while benefiting economical-
ly, have exposed society to the risks of commerce in hazardous substances.
Also, to assure the billions of dollars needed to deal with hazardous
chemical problems are available, while meeting the equally desired goals of re-
strained Federal spending, a fee on those who benefit from the commercial and
industrial practices which expose society to hazardous substances is especially
appropriate to these national concerns.
S. REP. No. 848, at 19, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 305,
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against the government, courts have confirmed this congressional
intent.52 Such agreements may only be enforceable, if at all, in a
suit among private individuals."
Generally, private litigation arises under CERCLA after the
EPA seeks enforcement against one of several potentially respon-
sible parties.' The individual party may recover response costs
from other responsible parties in a private cost recovery action, or
it may seek contribution from other responsible parties in defending
against CERCLA claims.55 Under theories of joint and several
liability, the first defendant may be held fully liable irrespective of
its actual participation in the problem.
From the perspective of buyers and sellers, therefore,
CERCLA liability risks can be disproportionate to actual conduct.
Under CERCLA's liability rules, liable parties are not always re-
sponsible for creating the initial pollution.56 In the real estate con-
text, congressional intent to impose liability on the blameworthy is
achieved imperfectly. "Innocent" purchasers who fail to inspect are
held just as accountable as the worst polluter. Besides penalizing
parties who cause pollution, CERCLA imposes costs on real estate
transactions generally, irrespective of who is actually to blame.57
52. See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir.
1986) (release agreements "cannot prejudice the right of the government to recover clean-
up or closure costs from any responsible party .... "); Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769
F. Supp. 973, 988 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (same), aftd, No. 91-2039, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
20496 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 1992); AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp.
525, 529-30 (N.D. Ohio 1990) ("Mhe first sentence of section 107(e)(1) voids contractual
arrangements as a defense in a suit brought by the government . . .
53. See infra note 170.
54. See supra note 47 (discussing the government's enforcement options under
CERCLA). As a matter of administrative convenience, the EPA may seek enforcement
against only one of the many responsible parties at most CERCLA sites. See Fitzsimmons
& Sherwood, supra note 13, at 765 ("In the government's discretion, and depending upon
who presents the most suitable targets, cost recovery actions may be initiated against all
or only some of the potentially liable parties."); Alfred R. Light, Antidote or Asymptote to
Contribution: Non-Contractual Indemnity Under CERCLA, 21 ENvTL. L. 321, 326-27
(1991) ("When there are multiple parties, the United States will almost invariably seek
full recovery, under a joint and several liability theory, from only some of those asso-
ciated with the hazardous substance release . . .).
55. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (distinguishing between private cost
recovery and contribution).
56. See Fitzsimmons & Sherwood, supra note 13, at 765 ("The parties involved in dis-
posal also will be responsible, but the landowner will be liable irrespective of whether
(s)he participated in or benefitted from disposal of the waste.").
57. See Hedeman, supra note 22, at 10,414 (noting that CERCLA raises overall litiga-
tion and negotiation expenses).
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B. Allocating the Risk of CERCLA Liability
CERCLA's liability rules provide buyers and sellers with a
strong incentive to minimize liability risks. One method to limit
CERCLA exposure is the negotiation of private risk allocations."8
Section 107(e)(1) of CERCLA provides contradictory guidance in
determining whether such private agreements are authorized. The
section consists of two sentences:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or
conveyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or
operator of any vessel or facility or from any person who
may be liable for a release or threat of release under this
section, to any other person the liability imposed under this
section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement
to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such
agreement for any liability under this section.5 9
In the words of one court, "[tihis inartfully drafted provision
seems internally inconsistent. The first sentence of section 107(e)(1)
appears to prohibit indemnification agreements under all circum-
stances while the second sentence of section 107(e)(1) appears to
permit indemnification under all circumstances." 6 More precisely,
58. There are other means to limit liability implicitly or explicitly recognized by
CERCLA. Section 107(b) provides three outright defenses to liability in the event of an
act of God, act of war, or act or omission by an unrelated third party. Furthermore, §
107(c) provides monetary caps on liability applicable in certain circumstances. Another
provision, added by SARA, facilitates the provision of pollution insurance by risk reten-
tion groups. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9671-9675 (1988). SARA also limits the liability of guarantors
who insure responsible parties against CERCLA liability, amending an earlier CERCLA
provision. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(d) (1988) (for citation of original provision see infra note
229).
59. CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988). Section 107(e)(2) provides:
"Nothing in this title, including the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, shall
bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or any other person subject to liability
under this section, or a guarantor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation or other-
wise against any person."
60. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1990),
affrd in part and rev'd in part sub nora. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials and
Services, Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Danella Southwest, Inc. v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 775 F. Supp. 1227, 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1991) ("The first section of
this obscure provision appears to prohibit indemnification agreements under all circum-
stances, while the second section appears to permit indemnification agreements under all
circumstances."); Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 987 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
("At first glance, the frst and second sentences of Section 107(e)(1) may appear to be
contradictory."), aff'd, No. 91-2039, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20496 (6th Cir. Sept. 1,
1992).
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the first sentence of section 107(e)(1) imposes a prohibition, but
the second sentence provides an exemption which may be read to
permit private risk allocations.6
Beyond the imprecise language, the legislative history of sec-
tion 107(e)(1) provides limited insight. Initial versions of the first
sentence were proposed as early as the 95th Congress.62 The
Superfund proposal submitted by the Carter Administration also
contained language which parallelled the prohibition in the first
sentence. 63
In the House, language similar to the first sentence was incor-
porated into H.R. 85,64 one of the three main Superfund proposals
introduced in the 96th Congress. 65 Committee report language in-
61. See discussion infra part IV.B.L.a (dealing with the language of the statute).
62. A precursor to the first sentence of § 107(e)(1) was added by the Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation to oil spill liability legislation originally introduced
by Senator Magnuson as S. 1187 on March 30, 1977, and reported by the Committee as
H.R. 2083 on Sep. 12, 1977, during the first session of the 95th Congress. To Establish
a Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Law: Hearings on S. 2900
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 128, 148 (1978) (reprinting § 6(j) of H.R.
2083 stating that no indemnification, hold harmless or similar agreement would be effec-
tive except as provided in the act). An almost identical provision was included as § 5(e)
in S. 2900, similar legislation introduced by Senator Muskie on Feb. 6, 1978, during the
second session of the 95th Congress. Id. at 64.
63. The Administration bill proposed the following language:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement shall be effective to
transfer from the owner or operator of a facility, or from any person who may
be liable for a release or threat of release from an uncontrolled hazardous
waste disposal site[,I ... to any other person the liability imposed under ...
this section.
H.R. Doc. No. 149, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTO-
RY, supra note 25, at 43. The section also exempted indemnification agreements between
a lessor and the lessee of an interest in oil exploration rights, apparently to accommodate
customary practice in the oil industry. This issue was also the subject of concern during
consideration of H.R. 85 by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. See H.R. Rep.
No. 172, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 45 (1979), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 25, at 555.
64. The relevant language of the bill stated:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement shall be effective to
transfer from the owner or operator of a facility, to any other person, the lia-
bility imposed under subsection (a), other than as specified in this title.
H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(h) (1979) (introduced by Rep. Biaggi), reprinted in
2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 496. The section also exempted leasehold
interests for oil exploration from the prohibition. Id.
65. H.R. 85, introduced by Representative Biaggi, would have established a fund to
provide compensation for oil spills and hazardous chemical spills in navigable waters.
However, the fund would not be available to pay for hazardous substance releases on
land. A substantially revised version of H.R. 85 was approved by the House on Septem-
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dicated that the section was intended to prevent a responsible party
"from attempting to pass his liability off to his contractors, whether
or not they are negligent, as a cost of doing business with him." '
This early version of the prohibition was approved by the
House;6' however, no similar language was contained in a com-
panion measure which the House later approved.6"
In the Senate, the legislative vehicle which ultimately became
CERCLA initially contained no language similar to the first sen-
tence of section 107(e)(1). 69 The current first sentence was added
to the bill during consideration by the Environment and Public
Works Committee." During later deliberation, the committee add-
ed a second sentence containing language of exemption, specifically
for the benefit of real estate transactions. 7' This early version of
ber 19, 1980. 126 CONG. REC. 26,391 (1980).
H.R. 7020, introduced by Representative Florio, would have established a fund to
pay for government cleanups of hazardous substance releases on land. H.R. 7020 was ap-
proved by the House on September 23, 1980. 126 CONG. REC. 26,798-99 (1980).
S. 1480 was the most ambitious of the three Superfund proposals introduced in the
96th Congress. The bill would have established a $4 billion fund to pay for cleanup of
hazardous substance releases and compensate victims who suffered personal injuries as a
result of hazardous substances. For further discussion of the legislative history of S. 1480,
see 125 CONG. REC. 17,988 (1979) (introducing bill); S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980) (reporting favorably upon the bill).
66. H.R. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 45 (1979), reprinted in 2 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 555. The committee report also noted that "[t]he
subsection does not, of course, prevent any person from serving as guarantor ... ;." Id.
see infra note 229 (discussing guarantor liability).
67. 126 CONG. REc. 26,391 (1980), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
25, at 1011.
68. See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071 (1980) (introduced by Rep. Florio)
(containing no similar provision as introduced or as adopted by House), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 3, 41, 391, 442.
69. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1979) (introduced by Sen. Culver) (containing
no language of prohibition as introduced), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 25, at 155, 168.
70. The initial language of the first sentence differed from the current text in only one
way, applying to "facilities" rather than "vessels or facilities":
No indemnification, hold harmless, conveyance, or similar agreement shall be
effective to transfer from the owner or operator of a facility, or from any per-
son who may be liable for a release under this section, to any other person the
liability imposed under this section.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
STAFF WORKING PAPER [NO. 1] § 4(i), at 28 (1980), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTO-
RY, supra note 25, at 193, 220. This language was similar to the provisions included by
President Carter and also contained in H.R. 85. No reference was made, however, to an
exemption for lessees of oil exploration rights. See supra notes 63-64 (discussing H.R. 85
oil lessee exemption).
71. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 96TH CONG., 2D
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the exemption was approved by- the committee and reported to the
full Senate,72 but it was later deleted during final compromise
negotiations. 3 Instead, Senate leaders inserted the current second
sentence of section 107(e)(1) providing a more general exception to
the first sentence.74
There is little public record concerning the drafting process
during these private negotiations,75 and there are few references to
the legislative intent behind the changes made to section
107(e)(1). 76 However, the language produced became the final
version of CERCLA enacted into law. 77 Unfortunately, the lan-
guage and legislative history of section 107(e)(1) fail to make clear
whether private risk allocations are enforceable, as demonstrated by
the resulting judicial treatment of the provision.
I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PRIVATE RISK ALLOCATION
A. Majority View: Enforcement of Risk Allocation
The majority of courts that have examined private risk alloca-
tions under CERCLA have found such agreements to be enforce-
able.78 However, these decisions merely recite the language of
SESS., STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 2 § 4(i), at 31 (1980) [hereinafter STAFF WORKING
PAPER No. 2], reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 245, 275. This
provision is more fully discussed in the analysis of this note. See infra notes 213-25 and
accompanying text.
72. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1980), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 25, at 351.
73. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 107(e)(1), 94 Stat. 2767, 2783 (reporting bill as re-drafted
by Senate leaders and enacted into law) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988)), re-
printed in 1 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 3, 19.
74. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (quoting language of exemption). Senate
leaders also altered the first sentence of § 107(e)(l) to cover owners or operators of
=vessels" as well as 'facilities." See supra note 70 (quoting text prior to the addition of
"vessels"). The final version of the second sentence may be viewed as an attempt to
broaden the proposed language of exemption beyond real estate transactions. See infra
note 218 (discussing congressional intent to exempt agreements between transporters as
well as agreements between buyers and sellers of real estate).
75. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing the circumstances of
CERCLA's enactment).
76. But see infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (discussing written colloquy
inserted into the Congressional Record on behalf of Sen. Cannon and Sen. Randolph).
77. A small number of floor amendments, not important for purposes of this note,
were permitted during consideration by the full Senate. See 126 CONG. REc. 30,936-56
(1980), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 698-751.
78. See, e.g., John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., No. 89-675-T, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13088, at *9 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1992) ("Initially, the court notes that CERCLA .
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section 107(e)(1) without recognizing any contradiction between the
statute's first and second sentences.79 Rather, these courts rely on
free market principles to justify private risk allocations."0
In the leading case, Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, LtcL, 8'
the Ninth Circuit examined a release agreement negotiated almost
two years after the original sale. 82 The court concluded that pri-
vate releases were valid under CERCLA.83 While the opinion pri-
marily focused on whether to apply state or federal law, the court
. . permit[s] private parties to allocate response-cost liabilities between themselves.-);
Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 355 (D.N.J. 1991) ("As a prelimi-
nary matter, the Court notes that as between private parties, CERCLA liability can be
transferred by contract."); Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448,
1456 (N.D. Ind. 1990) ("By its own terms, CERCLA expressly preserves the right of
private parties to contractually transfer to or release another from the financial responsibil-
ity arising out of CERCLA liability."); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1293-95 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding that the lan-
guage of §, 107(e) does not destroy contractual rights or invalidate indemnity agreements);
FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (D. Minn. 1987) (stating
that § 107(e) "clearly provides that CERCLA liability is not sufficient for the recovery of
costs between private parties where one such party has released the other from its
CERCLA liability"), appeal dismissed, 871 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1988).
79. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J.
1988) (quoting language of § 107(e) and following, without discussion, prior decisions
that enforce private risk allocations), reargument, No. Civ. 88-0700, 1988 WL 125855
(D.N.J. Nov. 23, 1988); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1573
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (quoting language of §107(e) and following without discussion prior deci-
sions that enforce private risk allocations); see also Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc.,
750 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub noa.
Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials and Services, Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that a majority of federal courts "have held with minimal discussion that the
second sentence of section 107(e)(1) completely negates the first sentence"). The failure to
acknowledge the defects in § 107(e)(1) leads to the inference that majority decisions have
not adequately considered the language of the statute. See infra note 106 and accompa-
nying text.
80. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
81. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
82. The facts of Mardan are as follows. In July 1980, Macmillan sold Mardan a plant
and property used for manufacturing musical instruments. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1456. For
ten years prior to the sale, Macmillan had deposited wastes in a settling pond on the site;
after the sale, Mardan continued these same waste disposal practices. Id. In November
1981, MacMillan paid Mardan $995,000 in exchange for a general release from "all ac-
tions, causes of action, [or] suits, . . . based upon, arising out of or in any way relating
to the [original] Purchase Agreement." Id. In 1983, the EPA brought an enforcement
action against Mardan, which required Mardan to clean up and close the waste site. Id.
Mardan estimated that the cost of complying would be between $500,000 and $1,550,000.
Id. Despite the release agreement, Mardan filed suit against Macmillan to recover these
costs under § 107(a) of CERCLA. Id.
83. Id. at 1458, 1460.
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reasoned that "[c]ontractual arrangements apportioning CERCLA
liabilities between private 'responsible parties' are essentially tan-
gential to the enforcement of CERCLA's liability provisions. Such
agreements cannot alter or excuse the underlying liability, but can
only change who ultimately pays that liability."'" Thus, the court
interpreted the agreement as shifting CERCLA's costs without
shifting CERCLA's underlying liability.85 At the same time, how-
ever, the persuasive force of this analysis was reduced because the
court did not recognize any contradiction in section 107(e)(1).86
In addition to finding that private risk allocations are generally
valid, the Mardan court also evaluated the release agreement be-
tween the parties in the case. The court concluded that the release
agreement contemplated CERCLA liability. 7
Three considerations guided the court's interpretation of the
agreement. First, because the language included all claims "based
upon, arising out of or in any way relating to the Purchase Agree-
ment," the terms of the release were broad enough to include
CERCLA claims.88 Second, the evidence suggested that both par-
84. Id. at 1459. The quoted language continues: "Moreover,... the result cannot
prejudice the right of the government to recover cleanup or closure costs from any re-
sponsible party, including Mardan, Macmillan, or both." IcL; see supra note, 52 and ac-
companying text (discussing further that private risk allocations are ineffective against the
government or other third parties).
85. Perhaps unwittingly, this insight represented a major breakthrough in the interpre-
tation of private risk allocations under § 107(e)(1). See discussion infra part IV.A.3 (ex-
plaining that while private risk allocations distribute rights between the parties to the
agreement, they do not impair underlying liability to third-party CERCLA claimants).
86. It is probably incorrect to assert that the Mardan court overlooked the language of
§ 107(e)(1). Rather, the court seemed to accept the position advanced by the government
as amicus curiae: "As the government points out, section 107(e)(1) expressly preserves
agreements to insure, to hold harmless, or to indemnify a party held liable under section
107(a)." Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458. This statement follows the language of the second
sentence of § 107(e)(1), but does not refer to the first sentence. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text (citing cases that support private risk allocations under CERCLA with-
out recognizing the contradiction in § 107(e)(1)).
87. 804 F.2d at 1461 (finding that the district court correctly interpreted the release
agreement to include CERCLA liability).
88. Id. at 1462. The court explained that "the language releasing Macmillan from all
claims by Mardan . . . cannot, under its own terms, . . . be limited to exclude Mardan's
section 107 claim, which certainly resulted from its acquisition of the property from
Macmillan." Id. The court also rejected Mardan's argument that the CERCLA claims were
not part of the release agreement because such claims were not brought "pursuant to" the
purchase agreement for the property. Id. at 1462 n.8.
For later interpretations of similar contract language, see, e.g., American Nat'l Can
Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg., No. 89-C0168, 1990 WL 125368, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22,
1990) (holding that a clearly worded indemnification agreement encompassing "'any claim
of any kind or nature whatsoever'" is sufficiently broad to support a claim for CERCLA
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ties were aware of conditions at the settling pond and that these
conditions were included in the release negotiations.89 Finally,
because CERCLA was enacted one year before the negotiation of
the settlement, both parties had notice of its provisions and could
be expected to anticipate the legal effects of the statute.90 Based
response costs), reconsideration in part, No. 89-C-0168, 1990 WL 129657 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
30, 1990); Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (N.D. Ind.
1990) (holding that a release "'from all claims and obligations of any character or nature
whatsoever' . . . clearly releases [a party] from future arising causes of action of any
sort, including CERCLA liability."); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp.
1285, 1292 (D. Minn. 1987) (holding that a general release "'from all claims, demands
and causes of action'" is sufficiently broad to include environmental claims), appeal dis-
missed, 871 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1988). But see Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761
F. Supp. 345, 358 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that a general agreement to indemnify a party
from future liabilities and obligations is insufficient to transfer CERCLA liability unless it
makes reference to environmental liabilities).
89. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1461. One year before the sale of the property to Mardan,
Macmillan had filed a "Notification of Hazardous Waste Activity" with the EPA. Id. at
1456. Upon taking possession of the property, Mardan obtained a permit to qualify for
interim status pursuant to § 3005(e) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6925(e) (1988). Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1456. When Mardan violated this permit,
the EPA brought enforcement actions. Id. During settlement negotiations with Macmillan,
Mardan originally sought $112,000 for any "corrective action" that might be necessary to
clean up the settling pond. Id. at 1461. However, this specific request was eventually
dropped in favor of a lump sum figure of $995,000. Id. at 1456.
Later decisions also examine the language and circumstances of agreements to deter-
mine if CERCLA liability was foreseeable and, therefore, included in the agreements.
Compare Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 358 ("The Court cannot expect parties executing a
contract prior to CERCLA to have foreseen the statute. However, in order for the Court
to interpret a contract as transferring CERCLA liability, the agreement must at least men-
tion that one party is assuming environmental-type liabilities.") and Chemical Waste Man-
agement, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(holding that implied warranty of indemnification does not exist in all waste disposal
contracts: "Congress has enacted a broad statute, and the policies underlying the statute
are clear. If owner/operators and generators wish to redistribute the risks distributed by
Congress, they must do so clearly and unequivocally.") with Danella Southwest, Inc. v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 775 F. Supp. 1227, 1241 (E.D. Mo. 1991) ("If the parties
know the hazardous nature of the substance, it is fair to assume that the parties were
cognizant of possible liability under CERCLA and the parties intended the indemnification
clause to shift liability for response costs under CERCLA.-) and FMC Corp., 668 F.
Supp. at 1292 ('[tlhe language of the Release states unambiguously that [buyer] released
[seller] from future arising causes of action . . . . Read in such context, the words can
only mean a reference to the future and [are not limited] to present unknown claims.").
90. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1461, 1463. Other courts examining private risk allocations
executed before CERCLA's enactment have resolved the problem differently. Compare
Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 348, 358 (holding that an indemnity agreement executed three
years prior to CERCLA was insufficient to shift liability without an express statement
regarding environmental liabilities) and Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp.
994, 1002 (D.N.J. 1988) (explaining that the parties clearly could not "be expected to
have presciently referred to CERCLA in an agreement which was executed two years
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on these three factors, the court enforced the release to protect the
seller from the risk of the buyer's claim.9"
Later courts following Mardan continued to disregard the con-
tradiction in section 107(e)(1). 92 For instance, in Rodenbeck v.
Marathon Petroleum Co.,93 the court upheld a general release be-
tween lessor and lessee because the agreements were "mutual re-
leases which clearly shielded [the] plaintiffs" as well as the defen-
dants.' Since there was valid consideration, the court enforced
the agreement under general contract principles and held the parties
to the benefit of their bargain.95 However, the court did not close-
ly examine CERCLA's language and legislative history.
Instead, the majority courts rely on free market theory as an
implicit rationale for enforcing private risk allocations.96 These
courts recognize the benefits derived through freedom of con-
tract97 and see private risk allocations as facilitating transactions
between private parties.9" However, because they do not address
prior to the statute's enactment; however, some clear transfer or release of future
'CERCLA-like" liabilities [was] required."), rearguinent No. Civ. 88-0700, 1988 WL
125855 (D.NJ. Nov. 23, 1988) with FMC Corp., 668 F. Supp. at 1292 (holding that a
release agreement was sufficiently broad to cover future causes of action, even though it
was executed thirteen years prior to the enactment of CERCLA).
91. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1461-63.
92. See Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (N.D. Ind.
1990); Southland, 696 F. Supp. at 1000. However, more recent decisions have recognized
the contradiction in § 107(e)(1) while adhering to the majority rule set forth by Mardan
and its progeny. See, e.g., Bowen Eng'g v. Estate of Reeve, No. 89-2649, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14548, at *45 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 1992) ('In spite of the seemingly contradic-
tory language contained in this provision, most courts have found that CERCLA permits
some form of contractually distributed liability.") (to be reported at 779 F. Supp. 467);
see also cases cited supra note 60.
93. 742 F. Supp. 1448 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
94. Id. at 1455.
95. Id.
96. See Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1025-26 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (Mhe majority interpretation of section 107(e) appears to be predicated on a pub-
lie policy that parties should be able to distribute the risk of CERCLA liability as they
see fit because liability under CERCLA is far reaching."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
sub non. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials and Services, Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th
Cir. 1992).
97. See id. at 1026 (stating that the majority rule "assures that responsible parties
rather than taxpayers will bear the cost of responding to the illegal disposal of hazardous
substances without unduly limiting the freedom of private parties to contractually distribute
the risk of liability").
98. See Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1460 (expressing concern for commercial disruption and
noting that through release agreements "the seller can relieve itself of the headaches as
well as the benefits of the old business and move on to new ventures").
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the contradiction in section 107(e)(1) and congressional intent be-
hind the statute, the majority decisions do not adequately justify
their position. A better approach would be for courts to confront
the problems in CERCLA's statutory language and address the
public policy concerns directly.
B. Minority View: Prohibition of Risk Allocation
Due in part to the defects in the majority decisions, a second
line of cases has taken a different approach to private risk alloca-
tions under CERCLA. 9 The minority view rejects private risk
allocations because such agreements conflict with the retributive
policy behind strict liability.'" The cases hold private agreements
ineffective between parties who are already liable under the stat-
ute.01 However, such agreements are permissible if they shift
risk to persons not already liable under the statute, such as insur-
ers.1'2 In other words, private risk allocations can only shift risk
beyond CERCLA's ordinary parameters; they can never allocate
risk between buyers and sellers of real estate.
In AM International v. International Forging Equipment,0 3
the Northern District of Ohio held that contractual releases between
buyers and sellers of real estate were not permitted under CERCLA
section 107(e)(1)."°4 The court noted that "[o]n its face, this sec-
99. See Polysar, Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., No. 5:89-CV-0238, slip op. at 29 (N.D. Ohio
May 15, 1991) (refusing to honor a hold harmless clause contained in a lease agreement);
CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1282-83 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(holding that release agreement between state agency and purchaser of property was inef-
fective to shield the purchaser against agency's CERCLA claim); AM Int'l, Inc. v.' Inter-
national Forging Equip., 743 F. S upp. 525, 530 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that seller's
release of all claims against buyer was insufficient to bar seller's suit to recover environ-
mental cleanup costs).
100. See, e.g., CPC Int'l, 759 F. Supp. at 1282 (holding that § 107(e)(1) forbids the
use of releases to guard against CERCLA liability and stating that such an interpretation
"is consistent with the statute's broad policies of encouraging cleanups and placing the
burden of their costs of those responsible for hazardous waste problems-); see infra notes
117-19 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
102. Id.
103. 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
104. Id. at 530. The facts of AM International are as follows. In 1982, AM Interna-
tional, Inc. (AMI) sold its plating and painting business to International Forging Equip-
ment (IFE). Id. at 526. Two years later, in exchange for $2.3 million, AMI released IFE
from "any and all [claims] of every kind and description, known or unknown, in law or
in equity, which AMI now has or may hereafter have against" the defendants. Id. at 528.
At the insistence of the defendants, AMI left certain hazardous chemicals on the site in
proper storage containers; however, the containers were mishandled after AMI's departure.
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tion is internally inconsistent,"1° 5 and rejected the majority deci-
sions because their holdings "render . . . nugatory the first sentence
of subsection 107(e)(1)."'06
The AM International court was the first court to examine in
detail the legislative history accompanying section 107(e)(1).10 7
The court quoted the Senate committee's proposed exemption for
real estate transactions but interpreted this proposal as "disfa-
vor[ing] releases except under strict conditions."' 08
The court also quoted a Congressional Record colloquy inserted
after Senate approval of the bill. t  Senator Randolph, one of the
bill's sponsors, responded affirmatively to the following character-
ization of section 107(e)(1) by Senator Cannon:
"The net effect is to make the parties to such an agree-
ment, which would not have been liable under this section,
also liable to the degree specified in the agreement. It is
my understanding that this section is designed to eliminate
situations where the owner or operator of a facility uses its
economic power to force the transfer of its liability to other
persons, as a cost of doing business, thus escaping its
liability under the act all together.""'
The emphasized language in this statement significantly influenced
the AM International court's interpretation of the statute."' Based
on this language, the court concluded:
In sum, Congress intended subsection 107(e)(1) to prevent
Id. at 526. In 1986, the Ohio EPA notified IFE that remedial action was required to
clean up the toxic waste at the site, but IFE refused to comply. Id. The Ohio EPA then
requested AMI to perform the cleanup. Id. AMI 'hired a company to clean up the waste
and paid $350,000 in cleanup costs. Id. Despite the release agreement, AMI brought a
CERCLA claim against IFE to recover these costs. Id.
105. Id. at 528.
106. Id. at 529. The court also noted that majority court rulings approved of private
agreements "with minimal discussion." Id.; see supra notes 79, 86, 92 and accompanying
texL
107. 743 F. Supp. at 528-29.
108. Id. at 528; see infra notes 213-25.
109. 743 F. Supp. at 529; see 126 CONG. REC. 30,984 (1980), reprinted in 1 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 764; see also 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at
vii (noting conventional practice of inserting bullet symbol to identify "statements or in-
sertions which are not actually spoken by Members [of Congress] on the Floor").
110. 743 F. Supp. at 529 (emphasis added) (quoting 126 CONG. REC. 30,984 (1980)).
111. See id. ("Senator Cannon's construction suggests a means of construing section
107(e) coherently.").
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the parties from contractually relieving themselves of liabil-
ity under the act .... In addition, by the second sentence,
Congress intended to permit any person to contract with
others not already liable under the act to provide additional
liability by way of insurance or indemnity."t 2
Thus, the court approved of attempts to spread risk outside
CERCLA's ordinary parameters, but prohibited agreements that
apportion risk between parties who are already responsible under
CERCLA.11
3
AM International's interpretation of section 107(e)(1) has been
followed by at least two federal courts.' 14 To support its analysis
and holding, the AM International court first reasoned that private
risk allocations hamper the parties' incentives to undertake prompt
voluntary cleanups: "Parties would be less likely to take the ini-
tiative if a mutual release were in effect among them, since the
release would confine the costs to any party which acted."' 1 5
Some commentators have supported this rationale." 6
112. Id. at 529.
113. Insurance carriers are the most likely candidates with whom potentially responsible
parties could enter into private risk allocations consistent with the AM International deci-
sion. However, it is unclear whether environmental insurance policies are widely available.
See Stephen C. Jones, Debate Rages Over Insurance Coverage, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24,
1992, at 20 (surveying insurance coverage issues arising from environmental litigation);
Milt Policzer, Courts Are Divided Over Definition of 'Damages,' NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25,
1991, at 28 (noting that "pollution insurance is practically impossible to buy today"); cf.
New Policy Protects in Superfund Cases, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Aug. 19, 1991, at 11
(describing liability insurance offered by the ERIC Group to protect against the risk of
undetected hazardous substance contamination).
114. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1282-83 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (agreeing with AM International in holding that a release agreement was
insufficient to relieve a party from CERCLA liability); Polysar, Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc.,
No. 5:89-CV-0238, slip op. at 29 (N.D. Ohio May 15, 1991) (hold harmless clause in
lease does not transfer CERCLA liability); see also Hudson Ins. Co. v. American Elec.
Corp., 748 F. Supp. 837, 842 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (describing AM International interpre-
tation as consistent with the statutory language and legislative history of CERCLA and
with resulting judicial interpretation), aJfd, 947 F.2d 826 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
61 U.S.L.W. 3195 (U.S. Nov. 2, .1992).
115. 743 F. Supp. at 529.
116. See Sargent, supra note 18, at 429 ("If a party is barred from seeking contribution
by indemnity clauses buried in real estate sales agreements, that party will have far less
incentive to assume voluntarily a hazardous waste cleanup."); Sevack, supra note 18, at
1591-92 (arguing that a prohibition on contractual transfers of liability is most consistent
with CERCLA's primary objective of "provid[ing] incentives for prompt, private cleanup").
However, this argument does not account for the possibility that a purchaser may be
more willing to undertake voluntary cleanups if it is benefitted by an indemnification
agreement that assures prompt recovery against the seller. See infra notes 184-88 and
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The court also evoked the retributive justification which Con-
gress had found persuasive when enacting CERCLA, declaring that
section 107(e)(1) "forbids giving effect to releases between
tortfeasors in CERCLA contribution suits.""' 7 This aim, to hold
polluters accountable, has also persuaded later courts and commen-
tators."" The AM International holding affirms Congress' intent
to impose liability on the persons who are responsible for creating
pollution." 9
However, since the AM International rule permits risk alloca-
tion beyond CERCLA's ordinary parameters, the rule achieves re-
tributive goals only imperfectly. If risk allocations are prohibited so
that polluters may be held accountable for their actions, it is incon-
sistent to permit such distributions of risk to parties otherwise not
liable, such as insurers. 2 ° Because Congress authorized parties to
distribute risks under certain circumstances, 2 ' alternative justifica-
tions are required to support the minority position.
accompanying text (discussing justifications for private risk allocations).
In practice, moreover, CERCLA's liability structure does not seem oriented toward
the encouragement of voluntary assumption of cleanup costs. See Hedeman, supra note 22,
at 10,426 ("Mhe [Superfund] process remains adversarial .... PRPs retain legal options
both to resist EPA and to seek to impose cleanup costs on other parties. It is unrealistic
to conclude that PRPs will not continue vigorously to exercise these options in their own
self-interesL").
117. 743 F. Supp. at 530 (emphasis added).
118. See CPC Int'l, 759 F. Supp. at 1282 (stating that although the AM International
decision contradicts the weight of authority, it is consistent with CERCLA's "broad poli-
cies . . . of placing the burden of [cleanup] costs on those responsible for hazardous
waste problems"); Polysar, No. 5:89-CV-0238, slip op. at 29 (following AM International
"because it best conforms to CERCLA's policy of allocating environmental response costs
to responsible parties"); see also Sevack, supra note 18, at 1592-93 ("Congress intended
to foreclose the possibility of any escape from liability. Allowing contractual transfers of
liability between potentially responsible parties would allow parties to undermine that
intent").
119. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
120. See Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 130 (W.D.N.Y.
1991) ("An insurance agreement between a liable party and an otherwise non-liable party
would allow the liable party to shift the response costs just as effectively as an indemnity
agreement between two liable parties.").
In addition, as one commentator has observed, the implication that "wrongdoers"
under CERCLA must always bear the costs for their acts is "curious . . . in view of the
strict liability nature of that law." Donald C. Nanney, Hazardous Waste Issues in Real
Property Transactions 35 (Cal. Cont. Ed. of the Bar 1990); see supra note 56 and accom-
panying text.
121. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
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C. Post-Majority Decisions: Enforcement Revisited
In the wake of AM International, courts have developed an
interpretation of section 107(e)(1) that reaffirms the majority deci-
sions and repudiates the AM International holding."2 These
courts re-examine the majority rule and openly evoke free market
theory to justify the use of private risk allocations. 23
In Niecko v. Emro Marketing Co., 24 the Eastern District of
Michigan expressly disagreed with the AM International court's
interpretation of section 107(e)(1). 125 The Niecko court analyzed
the same legislative history cited by AM International but conclud-
ed that AM International "failed adequately to take into consider-
ation the difference between a transfer of liability and an agree-
ment for indemnification or contribution between parties otherwise
liable to the government."1 26  The Sixth Circuit upheld Niecko as
"a more palatable and consistent interpretation" of CERCLA than
the minority view. 7
In Niecko, the district court focused on the protection afforded
to CERCLA claimants, usually the government, under section
107(e)(1).128 The court started with the proposition that responsi-
ble parties under CERCLA are jointly and severally liable to the
claimant and reasoned that "[i]t is this joint and several liability to
which Congress is clearly referring when it speaks of 'the liability
imposed under this section' in the last words of the first sentence
of . . . section [107(e)(1)]." t29 Then, like the AM International
court, the Niecko court referenced the colloquy between Senators
122. See Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal.
1990) ("AM International stands alone and is not the law of the Ninth Circuit."), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials and Services,
Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992).
123. See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (discussing free market justifications
for private risk allocations).
124. 769 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Mich. 1991), aft'd, No. 91-2039, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
20496 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 1992).
125. Id. at 990.
126. Id.
127. Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., No. 91-2039, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20496, at *10
(6th Cir. Sept. 1, 1992).
128. See 769 F. Supp. at 987-88. The court concluded that in § 107(e)(1) -Congress
intended to protect the rights of the claimant against attempts by owners or operators to
escape liability to claimants through private contractual devices." Id. at 988.
129. Id. (quoting CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1)). Further interpreting §
107(e)(1), the court stated, "The first sentence simply voids any attempted transfer of joint
and several liability to another party." Id.
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Randolph and Cannon following CERCLA's enactment.130 The
Niecko court interpreted the senators' discussion as indicating "that
the purpose of the section is to ensure that the responsible parties
will fund the cleanup. These responsible parties may enter insur-
ance agreements to add parties who will pay for the cleanup. They
may not, however, avoid liability to the claimant (usually the gov-
ernment) by transferring this liability." 3  Thus, the Niecko court,
like the court in Mardan,t32 concluded that section 107(e)(1) pro-
hibits allocations of liability, not allocations of costs associated
with liability." The Niecko court stated:
There is nothing in the first sentence that purports to pre-
vent liable parties under the Act from apportioning, allocat-
ing, or even shifting completely among, themselves the
liability that each party will owe the CERCLA claimant, so
long as each contracting party understands that it will re-
main jointly and severally liable to that CERCLA claim-
ant .... The liability remains with the transferor; the
transferee simply agrees to fund the cleanup on behalf of
the transferor t34
This emerging line of decisions,1 35  exemplified by Niecko,
130. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
131. Niecko, 769 F. Supp. at 988.
132. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986); see su-
pra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Mardan court's interpretation of §
107(e)(1)).
133. 769 F. Supp. at 988-89. For example, in an indemnification agreement, the bur-
dened party agrees to reimburse the benefitted party for costs incurred in a CERCLA
cleanup. However, such a contract for reimbursement does not permit the benefitted party
to "escape" CERCLA liability. If the burdened party were to become insolvent, the bene-
fitted party would still remain liable despite its contract with the insolvent party. In fact,
the benefitted party always remains liable to third-party claimants irrespective of the
agreement. See discussion infra part IV.A.2-3 (providing further examples supporting the
argument that private risk allocations do not dilute CERCLA liability).
134. 769 F. Supp. at 988-89 (second emphasis added).
135. The Niecko court's interpretation of § 107(e)(1) has been followed by at least one
additional federal court. See Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp.
124, 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1991), where the court stated:
Mhe statute itself states specifically that it does not bar agreements to indem-
nify parties for CERCLA liability. The only restriction the statute places on
such agreements is that they may not be used to transfer liability. In other
words, liable parties can contractually shift responsibility for their response costs
among each other, but they may not thereby escape their underlying liability to
the Government or another third party.
Id. In addition, the district court's interpretation in Niecko was affirmed by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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openly acknowledges that a prohibition of private risk allocations
"would effectively burden all contractual exchanges involving prop-
erty that may fall under CERCLA's purview." t36 The Niecko
court concluded that such a burden on contractual exchanges "was
not Congress' intention. 1 37 Thus, these recent decisions follow
the same free market approach underlying Mardan and other ma-
jority decisions 38  and clarify this approach in response to the
criticisms raised by AM International.39 Observing that real es-
tate transactions are significantly assisted by private risk alloca-
tions, this view finds in section 107(e)(1) an implicit balancing
between public and private interests in the real estate market." °
Private risk allocations allow the parties to shift risk between them-
selves without diluting CERCLA liability. As argued in this note,
these agreements are consistent with CERCLA's language and
legislative history.
IV. TowARD AN ANALYSIS OF PRiVATE RISK ALLOCATION
The judicial treatment 4' of private risk allocations creates un-
certainty in real estate markets. On one hand, a court may enforce
private risk allocations consistently with free market principles.42
On the other hand, a court may reject such agreements as permit-
ting responsible parties to escape CERCLA liability. 43 Without
satisfactory guidance, buyers and sellers are unable to predict
whether their agreements are enforceable. Reluctant to negotiate
136. Niecko, 769 F. Supp. at 989.
137. Id.
138. For a discussion of the market approach relied upon by the majority decisions, see
supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1460 (9th Cir.
1986) ("In fashioning a statute to further a federal interest, Congress seldom if ever in-
tends to pursue that interest at any cost. Rather, Congress seeks to balance that interest
against countervailing considerations, such as the utility of indemnification agreements,
which it recognized in section 107(e)(1).").
141. Compare AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 530 (N.D.
Ohio 1990) (holding release agreements invalid under CERCLA § 107(e)(1)) with Niecko
v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 988 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding environmental in-
demnifications valid under CERCLA), aff'd, No. 91-2039, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20496
(6th Cir. Sept. 1, 1992). For discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying
notes 103-34.
142. See supra notes 96-98, 136-39 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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over liability risks, and generally wary of environmental liability,
buyers and sellers may hesitate to enter new real estate transac-
tions. 1
44
A uniform judicial stance is needed to prevent doubt and ap-
prehension from impeding sales in the real estate market.'45
Courts should adopt a coherent analytical framework which views
private risk allocations as distinct contractual mechanisms distribut-
ing the risk of CERCLA liability." An appropriate framework
should be based on principles defining the function of private risk
allocations. 47 With these principles in mind, the judicial inquiry
should consist of two steps: 1) the determination that private risk
allocations are permitted under CERCLA; and 2) the interpretation
of agreements in specific cases.'48 Applying the approach sug-
gested in this note, private risk allocations are shown to be consis-
tent with CERCLA's language and legislative goals. Thus, the
proposed analysis will assist courts and practitioners to alleviate
uncertainty in real estate transactions.
A. Characteristics of Private Risk Allocation
An understanding of private risk allocations requires an exam-
ination of how these agreements function. This analysis consists of
144. See Gordon C. Duus, Environmental Issues Here to Stay in Real Estate, CRAIN's
N.Y. Bus., Jan. 29, 1990 (noting that CERCLA has made real estate negotiations more
complex, has caused closings to be postponed pending environmental audits, and has
killed some deals altogether); Chris Foran, Deals in the Balance: In Real Estate, Envi-
ronmental Risks Cloud the Art of the Deal, THE Bus. J. - MILWAUKEE, May 21, 1990
(claiming that uncertainty over the environmental status of some properties has slowed
many deals and killed others); New Policy Protects in Superfund Cases, supra note 113
(the danger of acquiring contaminated properties has reduced the number of real estate
deals completed); Stranahan, supra note 20 (noting that environmental liabilities may dis-
courage economic activity in the areas that need it the most).
145. No court or commentator has attempted to catalogue the language of private risk
allocations, and a re-examination of these terms would assist in understanding their func-
tions. While a complete catalogue is beyond the scope of this note, see supra notes 6-10
and accompanying text for a brief description of basic types of private risk allocations. In
addition to the uncertainty caused by CERCLA itself, the courts may reach inconsistent
conclusions when forced to interpret poorly drafted agreements. See discussion infra part
IV.B.2.
146. Failure to recognize differences in contract language can result in considerable
confusion. See, e.g., Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1455-56
(N.D. Ind. 1990) (examining whether release can "transfer" or "shift" liability, but not
interpreting related language of indemnity).
147. See infra part IV.A.
148. See infra part W.B.
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three parts. First, courts must recognize that the common intent of
private risk allocations is to distribute risk between the parties. The
language of the agreements provides two ways for buyers and
sellers to achieve this purpose, by active "risk shifting" or passive
"risk shielding." 149  Second, courts should recognize that private
risk allocations bind only the parties to the contract, not absent
third parties."' Third, because the rights of third parties are not
impaired, private risk allocations shift costs between buyers and
sellers without diluting underlying liability.' With an under-
standing of these principles, a coherent approach to private risk
allocations can be easily developed.
1. Sources of Risk and Related Responses
The purpose of private risk allocations is to distribute risk be-
tween the parties.15 2  From the perspective of buyer and
seller,'53 there are two sources of risk corresponding to the two
claimants authorized' under CERCLA's provisions."M The first
source of risk 'is potential claims by the other party to the transac-
tion. Both buyer and seller want to avoid liability resulting from
the other party's use of the property.' The second source of
risk is potential claims by third parties who are outside of the
initial transaction. For example, the government or outside private
parties, such as arrangers, transporters, neighbors, or the next gen-
eration of purchasers may bring claims.
The contractual language156 chosen for private risk allocations
149. See discussion infra part IV.A.1 (defining and discussing "risk shifting" and "risk
shielding" agreements).
150. See discussion infra part IV.A.2.
151. See discussion infra part IV.A.3.
152. See supra note 4 (defining "risk" as the likelihood that a party will incur
CERCLA response costs).
153. For purposes of the analysis of private risk allocations, it is essential to fix the
point of reference to one party's perspective in the transaction.
154. See discussion supra part II.A (discussing CERCLA liability provisions).
155. Seller fears that buyer will try to recover for costs incurred after seller has sold
the property. Of course, seller may also wish to foist liability upon buyer. Like seller,
buyer wants to avoid seller's claims, but buyer also wishes to ensure that seller remains
responsible for contamination left behind on the property. These concerns may be satisfied
through private risk allocations. See Michael Dore, A Practical Guide to Environmental
Indemnification Agreements, 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 297, 297 (1988) ("Whenever real property
or industrial establishments are sold or transferred, purchasers may demand indemnification
agreements in order to protect them from liabilities arising from prior maintenance or use
of the property.").
156. As in all contract analysis, the analysis of private risk allocations should begin
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allows the parties to distribute these risks in two distinct ways, by
active "risk shifting" or passive "risk shielding."' 57 From the per-
spective of the benefitted party, risk shifting is an offensive meth-
od, involving an affirmative shifting of risk away from itself to the
other party. For example, party X could negotiate to have party Y
assume all of X's liability.'58 The primary language used for this
type of allocation is the language of indemnification." 9 Thus, X
would possess an enforceable contract right to make Y pay for X's
liability costs. Because one party actively assumes the other party's
risk of liability, risk shifting allocates existing liability or alters ex-
posure to third-party claims."6
with the language of the agreements. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
202(1) (1981) ("[l]f the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great
weight."); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.10, at 513 (2d ed. 1990) ("Sometimes,
in the case of a written contract, the court need not look outside the writing to discern
the parties' purpose."). Of course, determining the purpose of a contract based exclusively
on the language is widely criticized. See, e.g., 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 535, at 17-21 (1960) (criticizing the frequently-expressed judicial statement that
courts must construe contracts "in accordance with the plain and literal meaning of the
language used"); but see JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 3-10, at 167 (3d ed. 1987) ("Although the Plain Meaning Rule has been con-
demned [by commentators] . . .it is undoubtedly still employed frequently or on occasion
by the great majority of the jurisdictions in this country.").
157. For reasons of convenience, this note treats these concepts in a simplified form. In
the real world, "[e]xperienced business persons, and their counsel, go to great lengths to
protect against future 'surprises,* so contractual provisions regarding environmental liability
can be quite sophisticated and complex." Ryan, supra note 3, at 132. An allocation may
include both active risk shifting and passive risk shielding in the same contract, with only
one party benefitted. For instance, "seller agrees to indemnify and hold harmless buyer."
See cases cited supra note 7. The analysis becomes even more complex if buyer and
seller mutually agree to indemnify and hold harmless each other, causing the burdens and
benefits to flow in both directions simultaneously. While these subtleties will not be dis-
cussed, the analysis holds true in all cases.
158. This example uses the generic variables X and Y (instead of S for seller and B for
buyer) to illustrate that the burdens and benefits of private risk allocations can flow in
either direction, from buyer to seller or from seller to buyer. For purposes of simplicity,
the example assumes a total offensive shifting of risk from X to Y. In practice, it might
be more common for Y to assume only a specified portion of X's liability. For example,
Y could indemnify X, but only against environmental harm caused by Y. Or Y could as-
sume all of X's liability up to a specified dollar amount. See Dore, supra note 155, at
300 ("[a]ll parties negotiating indemnification agreements should consider proposing caps
on the amount subject to indemnification"); Karlsson, supra note 6, at 54-55 (describing a
variety of contractual cost-shifting options).
159. See supra note 6 (defining and discussing indemnification agreements).
160. For instance, if X gets sued by an outside third party, X would be able to recover
its loss from Y by virtue of the indemnity. In general, parties will probably be unwilling
to assume existing liability; however, an indemnity may also deal with the first source of
risk involving potential claims between the buyer and seller. Buyer may seek to be in-
demnified by seller for contamination left on the property. Seller may seek an indemnity
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By contrast, a risk shielding agreement is more defensive,
involving a passive shielding against the risk of claims brought by
the other person. This second method uses the language of hold
harmless or release agreements.1 6  For instance, X could negotiate
an agreement where Y forgoes future rights to bring a claim
against X. In a risk shielding agreement, one party relinquishes the
right to bring a claim against the other. Thus, risk shielding repre-
sents a means to deal primarily with the first source of risk be-
tween the buyer and seller. 62
Parties may employ risk shifting and risk shielding to limit
exposure to claims brought by each other and by outside third
parties. Risk shifting and risk shielding differ in that the former
involves an active assumption of responsibility, while the latter
involves a passive release of the right to sue. Thus, contractual lan-
guage allows the parties to accommodate both offensive and de-
fensive concerns in minimizing their exposure to risk. The third
part of the analysis will further define allocations of risk, as distin-
guished from allocations of liability.'63 However, it is first neces-
sary to consider which parties are bound by the agreements.
2. Preserving Third-Party Rights
Private risk allocations impose obligations on the parties who
negotiate the agreement. However, the buyer and seller cannot bind
the rights of the government or other third parties, such as the next
generation of purchasers. t64 Otherwise, private risk allocations
from buyer to foist its liability on buyer. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; cf.
infra note 188 (illustrating how allocations of existing liability may be beneficial).
161. See supra notes 7, 9 and accompanying text.
162. The distinction between third-party claims and claims brought by the other party to
the transaction (i.e., buyer or seller) is retained for the purpose of analytical clarity. See
supra notes 153-57. One can see how this distinction may become blurred. For instance,
a claim brought. by a third party against Y may give Y a basis to bring suit against X.
Even though the catalyst for Y's suit is a third-party claim, rs action is classified as a
claim brought by the other party to the transaction. Similarly, note that risk shifting may
also perform a defensive function, effectively neutralizing claims brought by the burdened
party against the benefitted party.
163. See discussion infra part IV.A.3.
164. See Dore, supra note 155, at 297 ("The federal Superfund statute explicitly pro-
vided that while indemnification agreements would not shield the contracting parties from
liability to the government or injured third parties, they were enforceable as between the
contracting parties."); Fitzsimmons & Sherwood, supra note 13, at 783 (-CERCLA spe-
cifically recognizes the legitimacy of liability shifting instruments as between the parties to
the instrument, but only as between those parties."). For purposes of this note, the possi-
bility of an agreement between more than two parties is not considered.
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would allow the parties to escape CERCLA liability, contrary to
public policy.
There is no impediment to the enforcement of private risk
allocations between buyers and sellers of real estate." For exam-
ple, seller (S) negotiates a release with buyer (B,), providing that
B, releases S in exchange for a reduced purchase price. Since a
release agreement is risk shielding, S has effectively shielded itself
by Bl's relinquishing the right to bring a claim against S. Because
there is valid consideration," and presumably no fraud," the
agreement is enforceable as between S and B,.
However, the agreement provides no protection t6 S against
claims brought by third parties. S has shielded itself, but only
against the risk of claims brought by B1. If B1 sells the property to
a second buyer (B2), B2 is not bound by the agreement between S
and B,.16' If B2 incurs response costs, B 2 retains the option to
bring a claim against either B,, S, or both. 69 The outcome would
be the same if the government' or an unrelated third party (e.g.,
165. For the moment, the problem is considered in the abstract, aside from the debate
surrounding CERCLA § 107(e)(1). Further justifications for enforcing private risk alloca-
tions between buyer and seller are considered in part IV.A.3.
166. See CAI.AMAWI & PERILLO, supra note 156, § 4-2, at 187 (footnote omitted) ("The
essence of consideration . . . is legal detriment, that has been bargained for by the promi-
sor and exchanged by the promisee in return for the promise of the promisor."). In this
hypothetical, B1 promises to release S in exchange for the reduction in purchase price.
167. See id. § 4-4, at 193 (footnotes omitted) ("[E]conomic inadequacy may constitute
some circumstantial evidence of fraud, duress, over-reaching, undue influence [or] mis-
take . . . "). Here, the reduction in purchase price is presumed to be adequate, so there
is no defect in the formation of the contract.
168. See id. § 17-3 (citation omitted) ("The presumption is that the parties contract for
their own benefit and not for the benefit of third parties."). Thus, under the second part
of the analysis, S would be prohibited from requiring the agreement with B, to be bind-
ing on all of B's "heirs and assigns." Nor could S insist that B
, 
include a release
agreement to the benefit of S in B
,
*s purchase agreement with B2. Such attempts would
be void as against public policy. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, interesting scenarios develop when B, and B. voluntarily negotiate independent
private risk allocations. Unfortunately, this note cannot analyze all the various outcomes.
169. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988) (imposing liability
for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan"); SARA § 113(0(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f)(1) (West Supp.
1992) ("Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or poten-
tially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under
section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title."); see also supra note 48
and accompanying text (discussing private causes of action).
170. As previously noted, all courts agree that private risk allocations do not bar
CERCLA claims brought by the government. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
However, some cases erroneously read the majority view as enforcing private risk alloca-
tions under all circumstances. See, e.g., Danella Southwest, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
a neighboring property owner, a transporter, etc.) were substituted
for the second buyer. Thus, third-party CERCLA claimants retain
their rights under the statute irrespective of the agreement between
the first buyer and seller."7'
As the example suggests, private risk allocations bind only the
parties to the agreement and do not impose burdens on the proper-
ty that will run with the land."7 In general, covenants on the
property which burden successive takers are enforceable. 73 How-
ever, courts do recognize an exception against the enforcement of
covenants which violate public policy. 74 Although free market
theory supports private risk allocations generally, CERCLA policy
imposes some constraint on the free market. 75 Put simply, public
Co., 775 F. Supp. 1227, 1240 (E.D. Mo.- 1991) (citing majority rule as permitting indem-
nification under "all circumstances" and then citing Mardan as minority view holding that
indemnifications are invalid against the government); Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat,
Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1025-26 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (same), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part sub noma. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials and Services, Inc., 959 F.2d 126
(9th Cir. 1992); Polysar, Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., No. 5:89-CV-0238, slip op. at 27 (N.D.
Ohio May 15, 1991) (citing Mardan and majority cases for rule giving "full effect" to
private risk allocations).
171. Although the dynamics change slightly, the principle holds true if the parties
choose risk shifting rather than risk shielding. If S and B, negotiate an indemnification
agreement, with S remaining as the benefitted party, S will be able to enforce the agree-
ment and recover from B, the liability costs imposed on S by B2. Thus, the indemnifi-
cation agreement actively shifts the risk from S to B, for liability imposed by B2. How-
ever, S remains liable to B2 regardless of the private risk allocation negotiated between S
and B,; if B, breaches the indemnification agreement, S can still be forced to pay.
172. See, e.g., Watterville Indus. v. First Hartford Corp., 124 B.R. 411 (D. Me. 1991).
In Watterville, a second generation real estate purchaser faced cleanup costs imposed by
the Maine Department of Environmental Protection and successfully challenged a mutual
release agreement between the original seller and the first buyer of the property. The re-
lease agreement purported to bind the parties' successors and assigns. Considering whether
the release constituted an encumbrance running with the land, the court stated:
I do not find the release to be a covenant or burden that will run with the
land. The promise does not touch or concern the land . . . . It is not part of
an easement or conveyance . . . but a general release between the parties.
Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
173. See GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS § 10.01 (1990) (not-
ing that restrictive covenants meeting legal requirements "are generally considered valid
and enforced by the courts").
174. Id. § 10.02. Few courts actually bar enforcement of restrictive covenants on public
policy grounds, and those that do "usually base their decision on a conflict between the
covenant and an express statutory provision or a long-standing common law policy." Id;
see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 156, § 5.1 ("Occasionally, . . . a court will decide that
the public interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by some public policy and will
refuse to enforce the agreement or some part of it on that ground.").
175. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 156, § 1-3 (-While the parties' power to
contract as they please for lawful purposes remains a basic principle of our legal system,
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policy requires that the rights of third parties cannot be impaired.
This restriction on freedom of contract prevents property own-
ers from avoiding CERCLA liability altogether merely by selling
contaminated property. Although current owners would appreciate
this absolute protection, such an alternative would undermine the
policy behind CERCLA's liability provisions. 76 Congress de-
signed CERCLA to facilitate cost recovery by the government and
other private parties. This right to cost recovery is a fundamental
component of CERCLA's liability scheme.'" While voluntary
allocation of liability risks between buyer and seller may be justi-
fied, 78 allowing parties to escape all liability to CERCLA claim-
ants would thwart the liability provisions and impede the statute's
objectives. For this and other reasons,' Congress prohibited re-
sponsible parties from escaping CERCLA liability altogether. 8 '
CERCLA's legitimate policy objectives require that private risk
allocations bind only the parties to the agreement. While private
risk allocations are enforceable between the parties to such agree-
ments, buyer and seller cannot bind the rights of subsequent gener-
ations, the government, or other third persons. Thus, the second
part of the analysis shows that private risk allocations do not im-
pair the statutory rights of third-party CERCLA claimants. As
shown in the third part of the analysis, since third-party rights are
protected, underlying CERCLA liability is unaffected by private
it is hemmed in by increasing legislative restrictions.").
176. See supra notes 66, 131 and accompanying text. For example, without the restric-
tion, S could negotiate a release with B, binding B, and all other third parties. Thus, S
would be shielded not only against the risk of claims imposed by B,, but against the risk
of liability imposed by any CERCLA claimant.
177. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989)
('[O]ne of CERCLA's key provisions . . . permits both government and private plaintiffs
to recover from responsible parties the costs incurred in cleaning up and responding to
hazardous substances . . .).
178. See supra note 19 and infra notes 184-88, 232-34 and accompanying text.
179. Other policy goals would also be impaired if private risk allocations were effective
to prevent third-party claims. Congress wanted to ensure that the market price of goods
reflects true societal costs, including the costs of environmental response; strict liability is
an effective means to distribute societal costs through traditional market mechanisms. See
supra note 25 (CERCLA's legislative history shows Congress' intent to employ strict lia-
bility to ensure that industry bears the risks it presents to society). In addition, strict
liability may serve to deter reckless conduct. See id. The private cost recovery right also
supports the EPA's policy of negotiating settlements with solvent PRP's willing to begin
cleanups. See supra note 47 (discussing EPA settlement policy).
180. The first sentence of CERCLA § 107(e)(1) leads to this conclusion. -See infra text
accompanying notes 197-201 (construing the first sentence of § 107(e)(1)).
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risk allocations.
3. Distributing Risk Without Diluting Liability
The third part of the analysis applies principles derived from
the first two parts. Because private risk allocations do not bind the
rights of absent third parties, both buyer and seller remain liable to
these potential CERCLA claimants. The only true impairment of
rights is between the parties to the private risk allocation.
81
Thus, private risk allocations permit buyer and seller to distribute
risk between themselves; they do not allow the parties to escape
underlying CERCLA liability.
There are only two possible effects of private risk allocations:
1) to prevent either buyer or seller from suing the other; or 2) to
provide either party with a contractual right to reimbursement from
the other. Since the agreements have no power to limit the rights
of third parties, the allocation of risk only raises or lowers the
probability that a party will incur costs under CERCLA. It does
not prevent the actual imposition of liability by third-party
CERCLA claimants.
In other words, private risk allocations transfer exposure to
potential liability, not liability in fact. If the burdened party
breaches the agreement or becomes insolvent, the original alloca-
tion of liability provided by the statute remains unaltered. The
liability of either party to the third-party claimant remains fixed
regardless of disputes between the parties over the private risk
allocation."12 Since the parties always remain liable to third-party
CERCLA claimants, buyer and seller allocate liability exposure
between themselves (e.g., expected costs of third-party claims) but
not underlying CERCLA liability.183
181. Private risk allocations supplement CERCLA's liability structure without displacing
the statute's terms, a principle illustrated by the example used in part IV.A.2 above. Since
the agreement is a passive release of S by B,, or a shielding of S from the risk of B,'s
claims, the agreement provides no remedy to S against B, for liability costs imposed by
B2. However, if B2 sued only S, S would still retain her statutory right under CERCLA to
recover costs from B1. In this case, the release agreement bars only suits brought by B,
against S, not S against B,. Of course, the parties remain free to negotiate a mutual risk
shielding agreement benefitting both buyer and seller, or an agreement combining both
risk shielding and risk shifting. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
183. The conception of risk is consistent with the holdings in Mardan and Niecko rec-
ognizing that private risk allocations shift costs, not liability. See supra notes 84-85 (dis-
cussing Mardan) and 131-34 (discussing Niecko) and accompanying text.
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Free market theory provides an adequate justification for any
impairment of actual liability between the buyer and seller.' By
negotiating the terms of private risk allocation, buyer and seller al-
ter the degree of risk assumed according to their unique needs and
circumstances in the particular transaction." 5 Under free market
theory, this voluntary allocation of risk should lead to efficiency
gains.' Further, any change in position is offset by an adjust-
ment in the purchase price equal to the value of the risk assumed.
As the Mardan court stated, "If parties have intentionally waived
their right to cost-recovery, they have almost certainly received
some form of consideration in exchange for their waiver that sub-
stitutes for the damages they could have otherwise collected." 18 7
Thus, private risk allocations permit buyers and sellers to make
fundamental choices about resource allocation and risk distribution.
Besides benefiting buyer and seller, this private allocation of risk
can also further CERCLA's goals.' 8
These principles are illustrated by the example described in part
two above: S sells the property to B,, who releases S in exchange
for a reduced purchase price. B, sells the property to B2, and B2
incurs response costs. If B2 sues only B,, B, is prevented from
seeking contribution against S by virtue of the valid release agree-
ment. This result is justified because B, assumed the risk that
future claims might be brought by B2 in exchange for a reduced
purchase price. In addition, the parties may be uniquely able to
allocate risk efficiently. For instance, B, is in a good position to
184. See Farber, supra note 19, at 319 (the "neoclassical [economic] model supports the
enforcement of contracts ... as a means of attaining several economic goals: spreading
or shifting risks, optimizing choices between present and future consumption, and eliminat-
ing disruptions caused by mistaken expectations").
185. See DEAN W. CROWELL & ROGER L. FREEMAN, NEGOTIATING REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 5.26 (Mark A. Senn ed., 1988). The authors state: "Commonly, the
parties to a particular transaction will agree to some allocation of the liability for environ-
mental conditions depending on the individual desires of the parties and the exigencies of
the transaction." Id. § 5.26, at 308.
186. See supra note 19.
187. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986).
188. It is not difficult to imagine situations where private risk allocations further
CERCLA's aims. For example, B might be a large oil company able to execute cleanup
more efficiently than S, the individual owner of a contaminated gas station. However, due
to externalities, such as the high costs of potential litigation, or for other reasons, B may
be unwilling to complete the purchase unless relieved from defending against S's claims.
If S were not able to release B, the transaction might never take place and the cleanup
might not be completed.
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determine the likelihood of selling the property to a potential future
claimant, B2. Other results would be unjustified because one party
would be allowed to speculate at the other's expense. If B1 were
allowed to recover costs from S, despite the release agreement, B,
would obtain a windfall (such as a reduced purchase price) without
assuming a corresponding burden.
On the other hand, the release agreement provides no basis for
the parties to avoid liability to third parties. If B2 sues only S, S
would still be. liable to B2 regardless of the agreement between S
and B,. Despite the allocation of risk betweeni S and B1, S cannot
escape its underlying CERCLA liability to B2, the government, or
other third parties."" The agreement permits risk distribution be-
tween buyer and seller, but it has no effect on liability to third
parties. In effect, buyer and seller adjust financial responsibility
between themselves without diluting CERCLA liability.
As shown by this analysis, private risk allocations distribute the
risk of potential CERCLA claims between buyer and seller. Re-
gardless of this risk distribution, however, buyer and seller remain
liable to third-party CERCLA claimants. The impairment of liabili-
ty rights between buyer and seller is justified by the efficiency
gains realized through free market negotiations. While private risk
allocations permit voluntary risk distribution between the contract-
ing parties, they do not impair underlying liability to third parties.
Thus, the agreements allow cost shifting without diluting liability.
As discussed in the next section, this analysis of private risk al-
locations is consistent with CERCLA's language and policy goals.
B. Two-Step Judicial Inquiry into Private Risk Allocation
When considering whether private risk allocations are enforce-
able, courts and commentators should separate the analysis of justi-
fications for such agreements from the examination of agreements
in specific cases. Uncertainty over the enforceability of private risk
allocations may arise from two sources. First, CERCLA's language,
legislative history, and policy support conflicting assertions about
whether such agreements are permissible. Second, poorly drafted
private risk allocations may obscure the intent of the agreements.
Besides defining the abstract function of private risk allocations, an
189. See supra note 171 (illustrating the analysis in the case of risk shifting agree-
ments).
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analytical framework should resolve the uncertainty regarding the
enforcement of such agreements.
A two-step inquiry will help the courts to determine whether
private risk allocations are enforceable.l" First, it is necessary to
determine whether such agreements are permissible under
CERCLA 19 ' This step requires construction of the statute based
on the language, legislative history, and policy of the law."l Sec-
ond, courts must examine the agreements themselves to determine
the intent of the parties. 3 This step requires interpretation of the
contract based on the terms and circumstances of the agree-
ment.1 4 Both steps are important in resolving the uncertainty sur-
rounding private risk allocations.'95 In addition to concluding that
private risk allocations are consistent with CERCLA's language and
policy goals, this section offers brief observations concerning the
drafting of such agreements.
190. See Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1988)
(determining whether indemnity term constitutes a bar to CERCLA claims requires a two-
step inquiry); Purolator Prod. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 128-30
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (examining validity of indemnities under CERCLA, then considering
scope of agreements at hand).
191. Southland, 696 F. Supp. at 1000.
192. See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1988) ("The plain mean-
ing of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
its drafters," in which case "the intention of the drafters . . . controls.-) (quoting Griffin
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (alteration in original).
193. Southland, 696 F. Supp. at 1000.
194. See CALAMAtI & PERI.Lo, supra note 156, § 3-9 ("Interpretation relates to ascer-
taining the meaning of the parties.").
195. Failure to observe the distinction is a flaw in the reasoning of the AM Interna-
tional decision. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text. The court was called
upon to interpret a general release agreement benefitting the party who was clearly the
wrongdoer. (IFE had "insisted" that AMI leave hazardous substances on the property.
These waste materials were eventually mishandled due to IFE's neglect, resulting in the
need for cleanup. AMI voluntarily undertook the cleanup, despite the release agreement
barring its claim against IFE.) Based on facts sympathetic to the burdened party in a
broadly worded release, the court concluded as a matter of statutory construction that all
release agreements are unenforceable under CERCLA. Since the court found the language
of the agreement sufficiently clear to prevent voiding the agreement as a matter of con-
tract interpretation, the court resorted to an unprecedented construction of CERCLA §
107(e)(1).
This construction imposed substantial justice on the facts but erroneously voided all
private risk allocations without thorough examination of the agreements or their conse-
quences. Despite cases such as AM International where enforcement of clear language
yields an unfortunate result, such concerns are better resolved through careful interpretation
of the contract. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
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1. Step One: Statutory Construction
a. Language
The task of statutory construction is facilitated by applying the
three part analysis of private risk allocations.'" Consistent with
the rights of third-party claimants, section 107(e)(1) prohibits at-
tempts to escape CERCLA's liability provisions by negotiating
contractual agreements. In barest form, the first sentence of the
section states that no agreement or conveyance "shall be effective
to transfer. . the liability imposed under this section."" In its
ordinary sense, "transfer" means a passing from one to another,
implying that nothing remains with the first party. 1 8 The term
"liability" means liability imposed under section 107(a) by the
CERCLA claimant."9 Thus, the first sentence prohibits a party
from transferring to someone else the liability which is owed to the
CERCLA claimant.
This sentence is consistent with the proposed analysis of pri-
vate risk allocations. Since private risk allocations bind only the
parties to the agreement, buyers and sellers remain liable to third-
party claimants irrespective of the agreement between them.t1 In
this manner, private agreements allocate costs without diluting
CERCLA liability. The proposed analysis upholds the intent of the
first sentence to prevent transfers of underlying liability owed to
the CERCLA claimant."'
196. See supra part IV.A.
197. CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). For the
full text of the frst sentence, see supra text accompanying note 59.
198. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY 2427 (1986) (defining
transfer as verb meaning "to cause to pass from one person or thing to another"). In its
legal sense, the term is often used in connection with a "transfer" of real property. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1497 (6th ed. 1990) (defining transfer as verb meaning "[t]o
convey or remove from one place, person, etc., to another; . . . specifically, to change
over the possession or control of (as, to transfer a title to land)"). Because the term
"transfer" may imply a concept of removal, it is stronger than the terms defined in this
note as "risk shifting" or "risk shielding," which imply that the benefitted party can trans-
fer risk but must retain liability.
199. Niecko v. Enro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 988 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (stating that
"the liability imposed under this section" means the "liability of all liable parties to any
party that, under the Act, has a right to demand cleanup and redress of damages"), aft'4
No. 91-2039, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20496 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 1992).
200. See supra notes 84-85, 131-34 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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However, from the first sentence alone, it is not clear that
private risk allocations are authorized. The first sefitence imposes a
prohibition; it does not provide authority. Further, the sentence
does not mention transfers between liable parties, rather it applies
generally to transfers from potentially responsible parties2ra "to
any other person."2 3 Read in isolation, this prohibition on trans-
fers "to any other person" might seem to preclude risk allocations
between buyers and sellers.2" Howeve, the scope of the prohibi-
tion in the first sentence of section 107(e)(1) is determined by
reference to the second sentence.
The second sentence of section 107(e)(1) limits the breadth of
the first. It states: "[n]othing in this subsection shall bar any agree-
ment to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agree-
ment for any liability under this section."25 Because the term
"subsection" refers to section 107(e) itself, the second sentence pro-
vides an exemption which limits the prohibition in the first sen-
tence.
This exemption in the second sentence narrows the scope of
section 107(e)(1). By virtue of the second sentence, the first sen-
tence does not prohibit agreements to "indemnify" or "hold harm-
less" the benefitted party. The exemption thus applies to agree-
ments which are risk shifting as well as to agreements which are
risk shielding.2" Further, the exemption is not limited to agree-
ments between particular persons; rather, the second sentence ap-
plies generally to "any agreement" benefiting "a party to the agree-
ment."2 7 Therefore, the exemption extends to private risk alloca-
tions where buyers and sellers are parties to the agreement. Finally,
the sentence mentions agreements to insure, indicating that risk
distribution (i.e., cost spreading) is contemplated for inclusion
within the scope of the exemption. Because private risk allocations
are expressly exempted from the prohibition against liability
202. Sevack, supra note 18, at 1587 n.78 (interpreting language "owner or operator of
any vessel or facility or from any person who may be liable for a release or threat of
release" in § 107(e)(1) to mean transfers from potentially responsible parties).
203. CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988).
204. See Sevack, supra note 18, at 1588 (discussing "unavoidable conclusion" that the
first sentence of § 107(e)(1) prohibits agreements between responsible parties, but reaching
conclusion without consideration of second sentence).
205. CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
206. See supra part IV.A.1.
207. See Sevack, supra note 18, at 1588 ("Admittedly, nothing in this Isecond] sentence
expressly limits or defines the relative parties.").
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transfers, the implication is that these agreements are authorized by
the second sentence.
Section 107(e)(1) prohibits attempts to undermine CERCLA by
transferring the liability owed to the CERCLA claimant. By the
first sentence of the section, responsible parties are held account-
able for their actions and prohibited from escaping CERCLA liabil-
ity. However, the second sentence provides an exemption which
narrows the scope of the first sentence. This sentence exemlits
agreements to allocate the costs of liability between private respon-
sible parties. These private risk allocations are permitted because
they are consistent with the intent of the first sentence to prevent
responsible parties from escaping CERCLA liability. They are also
of significant assistance in facilitating the conduct of real estate
transactions.
b. Legislative History
The legislative history of CERCLA provides additional insight
into congressional intent regarding private agreements. 20 8 Howev-
er, due to the manner in which CERCLA was enacted, it is likely
that a minor provision such as section 107(e)(1) received inade-
quate legislative attention.2" The controversy surrounding the lan-
guage of section 107(e)(1) may have been the result of political
necessities and last-minute compromises in the drafting of the stat-
ute.210 In this context, it is likely that Congress approved section
107(e)(1) without careful forethought.2"
The draft proposals of section 107(e)(1) illustrate the context in
which the section was enacted. The House version of section
107(e)(1), flatly prohibiting contractual transfers of CERCLA lia-
bility, indicated congressional desire to prevent parties from escap-
ing CERCLA liability.212 The Senate's proposed version, on the
other hand, added language expressly exempting certain real estate
transactions.1 3 While inferences based on legislative history are
208. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.03
(5th ed. 1992) (noting that it is established practice to consider legislative history in de-
termining the construction of a statute, especially where the statutory language is inade-
quate or unclear).
209. See supra note 28 (describing the legislative history behind CERCLA's enactment).
210. See supra note 36 (reprinting correspondence from Sen. Stafford & Sen. Randolph
to Rep. Florio discussing the difficulties in enacting the Superfund bill).
211. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (noting the paucity of public record
to explain the final version of § 107(e)(1)).
212. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
213. STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 2, supra note 71, § 4(i), at 31, reprinted in 1 LEG-
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necessarily tentative, it is clear that the Senate gave special con-
sideration to the problem of real estate transactions.
The Senate's proposed exemption for real estate transactions
took effect if three conditions were met.214 First, the sale had to
be a "bona fide" conveyance in an arms-length transaction. t5
Second, there had to be written disclosure of all material facts and
conditions relating to the property.216 Third, the new taker of the
facility had to demonstrate adequate financial responsibility in
relation to the risks assumed.2 7  The exemption for real estate
was approved by the Environment and Public Works Committee
and included in the bill as reported to the full Senate.21 8 Howev-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 275.
214. The proposed second sentence stated:
[T]his subsection shall not apply to a transfer in a bona fide conveyance of a
facility or site (1) between two parties not affiliated with each other in any
way, (2) where there has been an adequate disclosure in writing . . . of all
facts and conditions (including potential economic consequences) material to
such liability, and (3) to a transferor [sic] who can provide assurances of finan-
cial responsibility and continuity of operation consistent with the degree and
duration of risks associated with such facility or site.
STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 2, supra note 71, § 4(i), at 31, reprinted in 1 LEGIsLATIvE
HISTORY, supra note 25, at 275. The language omitted from the above-quoted section
required the written notice to conform to § 3(a)(4)(C) of the bill, which required disclo-
sure of hazardous substances present on property in the deed for any conveyance of the
property. The section also required the imposition of restrictive covenants sufficient to
protect public health and welfare. STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 2, supra note 71, at 16,
reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 25, at 260. Section 3(a)(4)(C) was delet-
ed at the same time as the quoted language. Compare STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 2,
supra note 71, at 16 (requiring at § 3(a)(4)(c) that deeds for conveyances disclose the
presence of hazardous substances on the property) with CERCLA of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-510, § 103, 94 Stat. 2767, 2772-74 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1988))
(omitting the proposed notice requirement of § 3(a)(4)(C)).
215. STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 2, supra note 71, § 4(i), at 31, reprinted in 1 LEG-
ISLATiVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 275.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. The committee report not only affirmed the exemption for real estate transactions
but also added further insight into the legislative intent:
Nothing in section (4)(i) [of Staff Working Paper No. 2] is intended to prohibit
the purchase of insurance by common carriers to cover the liability imposed by
that section, nor is it intended to prohibit agreements among common carriers
or between common carriers and shippers by which one or several parties
agree to indemnify the indemnitee for losses incurred as a result of liability
imposed ....
S. REP. NO. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1980) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 351. The report language indicates an intent to permit
private risk distribution, at least between transporters. It also supports the inference that
the final language of the exemption in § 107(e)(1) was intended to apply more broadly
than the proposed exemption focusing only on real estate transactions. See supra note 74
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er, the unique concern for real estate transactions proved to be
short-lived, and Senate leaders substituted the current version of
section 107(e)(1) which fails to include a real estate exemp-
tion.2
19
Despite the strong congressional desire to hold responsible
parties accountable for CERCLA liability,22 the proposed real es-
tate exception indicates that Congress was not as concerned about
private allocations of costs in properly functioning markets."
Rather, the conditions in the proposal indicate congressional intent
to guard against market imperfections. For example, the require-
ments of notice and disclosure indicate concern to eliminate dispar-
ities in knowledge and bargaining power.22  Moreover, the condi-
tions of arms-length dealing and financial responsibility indicate
concern to prevent sham transactions between related parties (e.g.,
transferring contaminated property to a willing insolvent). 23 Fi-
nally, while favoring beneficial transactions, the concern for finan-
cial responsibility indicates a concern to ensure that cleanup costs
do not fall on third-party claimants, such as the government.224 In
theory, the conditions create a perfect market for the proper negoti-
ation of private risk allocations. While the proposal indicates con-
cern about market imperfections, it does not indicate opposition to
private agreements allocating cleanup costs.
2 25
and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 73-74 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
221. Similar support for private allocations in properly functioning markets is demon-
strated by congressional adoption of the "pollution credits" approach to the problem of
acid rain in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 7651 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 11 1989-1991) (declaring that emissions limitations "may be met through alternative
methods of compliance provided by an emission allocation and transfer system.-).
222. STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 2, supra note 71, § 4(i), at 31, reprinted in 1 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 275; see supra note 216 and accompanying text.
223. STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 2, supra note 71, § 4(i), at 31, reprinted in 1 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 275; see supra notes 215, 217 and accompanying
texL
224. STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 2, supra note 71, § 4(i), at 31, reprinted in 1 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 275; see supra note 217 and accompanying text.
225. The AM International court was unimpressed by the draft proposal and dismissed it
as "disfavor[ing] releases except under strict conditions." AM Int'l v. International Forging
Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D. Ohio 1990); see supra note 108 and accompanying
text (discussing the court's interpretation of the proposed real estate exemption); see also
Sevack, supra note 18, at 1584 n.58 (accepting AM International court's dismissal of the
Senate proposal without further analysis).
However, the AM International court did not consider whether these conditions exist
in typical real estate transactions. The court ignored the evident intent of the proposed
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Although not conclusive, the legislative history of section
107(e)(1) is not adverse to private risk allocations. Congress in-
tended to prevent responsible parties from passing off their liability
to subordinate entities possessing unequal bargaining power. 6
This intent justifies the first sentence of section 107(e)(1) prohibit-
ing the transfer of liability.227 In arms-length real estate transac-
tions, however, Congress contemplated (at least momentarily) al-
lowing parties to allocate liability between themselves through
private agreements.' This provision and the current second sen-
tence of section 107(e)(1) appear consistent with an overall con-
gressional intent to permit risk allocation in appropriate circum-
stances. 9
Despite this apparent support for private risk allocations,
CERCLA's legislative history is not conclusive. Because the pro-
cess of CERCLA's enactment was chaotic and politically charged,
inferences based on legislative history alone are not sufficiently
persuasive. Adequate policy justifications must be developed to
support a rule governing private risk allocations under CERCLA.
c. Policy
In interpreting CERCLA's language and legislative history, the
courts have resorted to implicit and explicit policy assumptions.
Echoing the concern expressed among congressional
decisionmakers, the AM International court viewed private risk
allocations as allowing liable parties to escape responsibility under
language to exclude real estate transactions from the first sentence of § 107(e)(1).
226. H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 1st Ses., pt. 1, at 45 (1979), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 555; see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
227. CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988); see supra notes 197-201 and
accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 2, supra note 71, § 4(i), at 31, reprinted in
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 275; see supra notes 213-25 and accompany-
ing text.
229. The legislative history provides other examples of congressional support for risk
allocation in varying contexts. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9673 (1988) (encouraging, through
special exemptions, the formation of risk retention groups to spread or assume liability for
pollution among group members); CERCLA of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 108(d), 94
StaL 2767, 2787 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 9608(d) (1988)) (limiting liability of
guarantor "to the monetary limits of the policy of insurance or indemnity contract such
guarantor has undertaken"); S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1980) (expressing
support for insurance and indemnity contracts among transporters), reprinted in 1 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 351; H.R. Doc. No. 149, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 20
(1979) (approving of indemnification agreements between lessors and lessees of oil explo-
ration rights), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 43.
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the statute.2" The court maintained that CERCLA's retributive
justifications required those who create pollution to be held respon-
sible for the consequences.231
This "polluters pay" rationale has powerful appeal, but it is not
always appropriate when applied to real estate transactions. As a
strict liability statute, responsible parties under CERCLA are liable
without fault. Liable parties may be responsible for problems not
of their own making, and innocent purchasers may be punished for
failure to inspect the premises. In these circumstances, the retribu-
tive notion loses its force because the parties who are legally liable
may not be actually responsible for crdating pollution problems.
Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings, the imposition of strict
liability is justified. By placing liability on parties to real estate
transactions, Congress ensured that pollution costs are reflected in
the value of real property. This liability encourages inspection and
deters environmental contamination. In CERCLA, Congress max-
imized governmental cost recovery and internalized the cost of
pollution in the real estate market. In determining whether the
government or private responsible parties should pay for environ-
mental response costs, Congress clearly chose the latter. This deci-
sion represents a legitimate allocation of CERCLA liability by
Congress. While the allocation of costs to the private sector gener-
ally may be appropriate, CERCLA's liability structure does not set-
tle the question of who should pay as between private individuals.
Statutory allocation of liability runs counter to free market
justifications for allowing private parties to negotiate liability risks.
In a properly functioning market, private risk allocations permit
parties to apportion risks between themselves in an efficient and
cost-effective manner. 2 This private negotiating process provides
certainty and stability in real estate markets and allows parties to
minimize their risks before consummating a transaction. In addi-
tion, private allocation of risk may provide confidence and allow
parties to enter new transactions more freely. With the current
weakness in real estate markets,233 the benefits of private risk al-
230. AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 530 (N.D. Ohio 1990);
see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
231. 743 F. Supp. at 530; see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
232. See Fitzsimmons & Sherwood, supra note 13, at 790 ("Once [a] rough total esti-
mate of liability is determined, the buyer is in a better position to make a judgment on
the transaction. If the potential liability is less than the value of the transaction, it may
still be worth going forward. If the liability is more, or equivalent with a realistic assess-
ment of the value of the transaction, it should not be consummated.-)
233. J.P. Morgan, Other Big Banks Report Net Incone Gains, L.A. TIMES, July 14,
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location may be increasingly important.
The market rationale favoring private risk allocations is con-
sistent with the legislative intent of CERCLA. Congressional inter-
est in the- market benefits of private agreements is apparent in the
language and legislative history of section 107(e)(1). 23' This lan-
guage and legislative history indicate support for private risk distri-
bution, so long as private efforts do not impair CERCLA's effec-
tiveness in funding cleanups of hazardous substances. A free mar-
ket justification is also relied on by the judicial decisions that
enforce private risk allocations under CERCLA.
2. Step Two: Contract Interpretation
After examining the language, legislative history and policy
considerations of CERCLA, courts must also interpret the language
of private risk allocations in specific cases. The interpretation of
agreements in particular circumstances is a distinct question from
whether or not such agreements are permissible. To facilitate judi-
cial interpretation, drafters of private risk allocations should ex-
plicitly refer to environmental liabilities, preferably mentioning
CERCLA by name.
Because the goal of contract interpretation is to determine the
meaning of the language used,235 courts will look directly to the
contract language to determine if environmental liabilities are in-
cluded in the agreement.2 36 Courts will also examine surrounding
circumstances to determine whether CERCLA-type liabilities were
contemplated at the time of negotiations.237 Using clear expres-
sions of intent, practitioners can assist courts in this effort. In
drafting private risk allocations, counsel should specifically state
the intended purpose to allocate the risk of environmental liability.
Precise drafting of the contract terms will protect the parties' intent
1992, at D2 (noting that Chase Manhattan Corporation expects its credit loss provisions to
remain at very high levels because of the continuing weakness in the economy and the
depressed commercial real estate market); Tcrri Thompson, A Crushing Load for the
Banks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 15, 1992, at 50 (explaining that due to the
"shattered" real estate market America's ailing bank industry remains in critical condition).
234. See supra parts IV.B.1.a-b (discussing the language and legislative history of §
107(e)(1)).
235. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 156, § 7.7, at 496 (discussing in detail the process
of interpretation).
236. See cases cited supra note 88 (discussing judicial interpretation of various contract
language).
237. See cases cited supra note 89 (discussing foreseeability of CERCLA liability in
contract negotiations).
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and remove uncertainty in the enforcement of such agreements.
Private risk allocations should employ the techniques of active
risk shifting or passive risk shielding. 8 The selection of appro-
priate contract terms is important. For instance, a boilerplate "as is"
provision will likely be held ineffective against the risk of
CERCLA liability.239 On the other hand, a release agreement may
be upheld in a contract of sale, even though it is similarly buried
in boilerplate language.2" Counsel should avoid the difficulty of
selecting appropriate terms by expressly memorializing that envi-
ronmental liabilities have been negotiated.
Contract interpretation is a legitimate exercise of judicial exper-
tise. If buyers and sellers wish to allocate the risk of environmental
liability, they should expressly state this intention in the purchase
agreement rather than assume that this intent will be read into
traditional contract language.24 The traditional uses of indemnifi-
cation, hold harmless, "as is" and release agreements may be well
understood, but these terms are less familiar to courts in the specif-
ic context of environmental liability. If the parties merely rely on
traditional contract language without explicitly mentioning environ-
238. See discussion supra part W.A.1 (discussing in detail the concepts of risk shifting
and risk shielding).
239. See, e.g., Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784,
803 n.20 (D.NJ. 1989) (stating that the party who signs an "as is" contract does not
automatically assume the risk of any abnormally dangerous condition that exists on the
property); International Clinical Lab. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding that "as is" clause in a contract does not bar buyer's subsequent suit to recover
cleanup costs under CERCLA); In re Sterling Steel Treating Inc., 94 B.R. 924, 930-31
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989) (same); Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Electronics
Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (same); see also Southland Corp. v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding that for a contract to
preclude recovery of response costs, "some clear transfer or release of future 'CERCLA-
like' liabilities is required").
240. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (D. Minn.
1987) (finding that a release "from all claims, demands and causes of action" is sufficient
to release a party from CERCLA liability), appeal dismissed, 871 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir.
1988).
241. See cases cited supra notes 88-89. Of course, the parties should also expressly
state their intention to have the agreement survive merger of the contract terms into the
deed of sale. See generally MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF
REAL PROPERTY § 7.2, at 790-92 (4th ed. 1984) ("The effect of merger may be qualified
by agreement. . . .The usual effect of merger by deed is to reduce the obligations of the
seller . . . .But this is not invariable."). Where the deed is not a complete statement of
the parties' obligations, extrinsic evidence of intent will usually be controlling. See, e.g.,
Szabo v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. Rptr. 837, 840 (Ct. App. 1978) (determining whether
deed supersedes representations in purchase agreement requires interpretation of parties'
intent).
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mental liability, the parties' intent may be frustrated by judicial
interpretation of the agreement.
Nevertheless, judicial oversight may also function to temper
imperfections in the negotiating process. As with other market
economies, the market for private risk allocations may be adversely
affected by imperfect or improper negotiations. The. potential prob-
lems include unequal bargaining power, lack of information,242 or
misrepresentations about environmental conditions. In addition,
courts have recognized that a seller's failure to disclose conditions
on the property is a perversion of the negotiating process.243
Courts will police private risk allocations in order to limit unfair-
ness in specific cases.2' However, as with other contracts, en-
forcement of freely negotiated private risk allocations should be
recognized as the general rule.24
C. Limits and Benefits of Private Risk Allocation
Parties should be fully aware of the limitations and benefits of
private risk allocations. These agreements do not provide absolute
protection against CERCLA liability.246 On the contrary, since
third parties are not bound by the terms of these agreements, pri-
vate risk allocations may be less worthwhile than buyers and
sellers currently believe. In effect, third parties such as the govern-
ment or future generations of purchasers can trump risk allocations
242. See supra note 20 (discussing the widespread use of environmental audits to pro-
vide potential buyers with information about property).
243. See CROWELL & FREEMAN, supra note 185, § 1.5, at 15 ("[W]hen the seller
knows something about the property that is material and detrimental, courts may find the
seller liable on a fraud theory if the seller fails to disclose the information."); see also
Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a real
estate broker was required to disclose soil problems on land sold to the plaintiffs since
the soil problems were material defects known to the broker but not known to the plain-
tift); Griffith v. Byers Constr. Co., 510 P.2d 198, 203 (Kan. 1973) (holding that where a
seller has knowledge of a defect in property which is not reasonably observable or dis-
coverable by the buyer, the failure to disclose the default constitutes fraudulent conceal-
ment).
244. See, e.g., Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1455 (N.D.
Ind. 1990) (considering plaintiff's claim that releases were contracts of adhesion and there-
fore unenforceable).
245. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 156, § 4.1, at 226 (stating that courts are reluctant
to interfere with the substance of contractual agreements and will generally enforce the
bargain as made, "favoring the stability or security of transactions and the protection of
parties' expectations").
246. See supra notes 168-71, 189 and accompanying text (illustrating how private risk
allocations do not allow the contracting parties to escape their ultimate liability under
CERCLA).
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negotiated between the original buyer and seller.247 Buyers and
sellers of commercial property must take account of the risk repre-
sented by potential third-party claims when negotiating private risk
allocations.24
Despite these limitations, however, private risk allocations
substantially assist in facilitating real estate transactions. Risk shift-
lug provides a mechanism for the parties to minimize exposure to
the risk of third-party CERCLA claims.249 While also protecting
against third-party claims,25 risk shielding primarily represents a
means to protect against the risk of claims by the other party to
the transaction." These techniques provide flexibility in the ne-
gotiating process and facilitate the parties' ability to close real
estate transactions successfully. Because of these benefits, private
risk allocations may further CERCLA's ultimate goal of cleaning
up pollution caused by hazardous substances." 2
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding private agreements to allocate
CERCLA liability creates doubt and uncertainty in real estate mar-
kets. A consistent approach is needed in order to provide stability
and alleviate apprehension among buyers and sellers. The analytical
framework developed in this note demonstrates why these "private
risk allocations" should be enforceable.
First, the agreements must be viewed as allocating the risk, or
expected costs, of potential CERCLA liability claims, not the
CERCLA liability itself. Private risk allocations distribute this risk
by either active risk shifting or passive risk shielding. Second,
private risk allocations bind only the parties to the agreement.
Between these private parties, the impairment of liability rights is
justified by the efficiency gains realized through free market nego-
247. See supra notes 164, 169, 177, 180 and accompanying text (explaining how and
why parties to private risk allocations remain liable to third parties).
248. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing how parties determine the
overall value of transactions by examining potential liabilities).
249. See supra notes 160, 162 and accompanying text (describing risk shifting and
noting that it may also serve a defensive function).
250. Risk shielding protects a party against suits for contribution brought by the other
party to the transaction after third-party liability is imposed on that other party to the
transaction. This occurs if B2 sues B, who then attempts to sue S, who is protected from
Bl's suit by a risk shielding agreement. See supra notes 157, 162, 181.
251. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 188.
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tiations. Third, because third-party rights are not impaired, private
risk allocations allow buyer and seller to allocate risk between
themselves, without diluting underlying liability to other CERCLA
claimants. By virtue of this analysis, the congressional concern to
preserve CERCLA liability is harmonized with the policy of pro-
moting private risk distribution.
THADDEUS BEREDAY

